A Virtue Politics for Liberal Democracy

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Onora, O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

  2. 2.

    See Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

  3. 3.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971]), p. 4.

  4. 4.

    See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1094b5–10.

  5. 5.

    Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. Gregory Hays (New York: Modern Library, 2002), IX.29.

  6. 6.

    See Julia Annas, “My Station and Its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of Virtue,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 102 (2002), pp. 109–123.

  7. 7.

    See Aristotle, op. cit., 1095a15.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    See Cicero, On Moral Ends, ed. Julia Annas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.11–12.

  10. 10.

    See Daniel C. Russell, “Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good Life,” in Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel C. Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 14–18.

  11. 11.

    See Deidre McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), Parts 1–4.

  12. 12.

    See Julia Annas, “Epictetus on Moral Perspectives,” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, eds. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 145.

  13. 13.

    See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 5.

  14. 14.

    Aristotle, op. cit., 1140a25.

  15. 15.

    See Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Ch. 1.

  16. 16.

    Rawls, op. cit., p. 6.

  17. 17.

    Daniel C. Russell, “Virtue Ethics and Political Philosophy,” in The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, eds. Gerald Gaus and Fred D’Agostino (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 364.

  18. 18.

    The following arguments are excerpted from Tristan J. Rogers, “Virtue Ethics and Political Authority,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Summer 2020), pp. 303–321.

  19. 19.

    P.F. Strawson, “Social Morality and the Individual Ideal,” Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 136 (January 1961), pp. 6–7.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid. (emphasis added).

  22. 22.

    Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 206. See also, John Horton, Political Obligation, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Ch. 6–7, and Samuel Scheffler, “Membership and Political Obligation,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2018), pp. 3–23.

  23. 23.

    See Michael O. Hardimon, “Role Obligations,” The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), pp. 333–63.

  24. 24.

    See Roger Scruton, The Soul of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 89–95.

  25. 25.

    Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), Ch. 21, para. 10.

  26. 26.

    Rosalind Hursthouse, “After Hume’s Justice,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 91 (1990–1991), p. 242.

  27. 27.

    Mark LeBar, “Virtue and Politics,” in Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel C. Russell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 272.

  28. 28.

    Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Ryan Hanley (New York: Penguin Classics, 2009), Part VI, Sec. II, Ch. II.

  29. 29.

    See Plato, Crito, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), pp. 37–48.

  30. 30.

    See Aristotle, Politics, ed. C.D. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1998), 1252b30, 1260b25, 1278b24.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., 1323a15–20.

  32. 32.

    See Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 8.

  33. 33.

    Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 2nd. Ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003 [1981]), p. 253.

  34. 34.

    John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1997]), p. 573.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    See Ronald Beiner, What’s the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), Ch. 3.

  37. 37.

    See also Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl, Norms of Liberty (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2005), Ch. 11.

  38. 38.

    See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005 [1993]), p. xxxvii (fn. 5).

  39. 39.

    See John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” op. cit., pp. 581–2.

  40. 40.

    Roger Scruton, “Hayek and Conservatism,” in Cambridge Companion to Hayek, ed. Edward Feser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 225.

  41. 41.

    See John Kekes, “Conservative Theories,” in Handbook of Political Theory, eds. Gerald Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (London: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 136–138.

  42. 42.

    See MacIntyre, op. cit., Ch. 15.

  43. 43.

    See Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), Ch. VI–VIII.

  44. 44.

    Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p. 4.

  45. 45.

    See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in Aquinas: Political Writings, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II–II q. 58 a. 1c, p. 168.

  46. 46.

    Mark LeBar, “The Virtue of Justice Revisited,” in The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, eds. Stan van Hooft and Nafsika Athanassoulis (London: Acumen Publishing, 2014), pp. 270–1.

  47. 47.

    Adam Smith, op. cit., Part VI, Sec. II, Ch. II.

  48. 48.

    See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p. 99.

  49. 49.

    The following is excerpted from Tristan J. Rogers, “Justice as Lawfulness,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (Summer 2018), pp. 262–278.

  50. 50.

    See Richard Kraut, Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 105–6.

  51. 51.

    Adam Smith, op. cit., Part VI, Sec. II, Ch. II.

  52. 52.

    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1129b15.

  53. 53.

    See LeBar, “Virtue and Politics,” op. cit., p. 277.

  54. 54.

    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1155a25.

  55. 55.

    David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” in Moral Philosophy, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2006), Sec. III.

  56. 56.

    David O’Connor, “Aristotelian Justice as a Personal Virtue,” Midwestern Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 13 (1998), pp. 425–6 (emphasis added).

  57. 57.

    See Daniel C. Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch. 1.

  58. 58.

    Daniel C. Russell, “What Virtue Ethics Can Learn from Utilitarianism,” in Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, eds. Ben Eggleston and Dale Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 268.

  59. 59.

    See Hursthouse, “After Hume’s Justice,” op. cit., p. 234–6.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 243.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    See Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), pp. 3–4.

  63. 63.

    See Samuel Bowles, “Is Liberalism a Parasite on Tradition?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2011), p. 46.

  64. 64.

    See Aristotle, Politics, op. cit., 1310a15–35.

  65. 65.

    See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1130b20–25.

  66. 66.

    See Gerald Dworkin, “Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality,” William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1999), pp. 927–946.

  67. 67.

    See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit., 1103b5–25.

  68. 68.

    Hursthouse, “After Hume’s Justice,” op. cit., p. 245.

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This article is a precis of my forthcoming book The Authority of Virtue: Institutions and Character in the Good Society (Routledge, November 2020). It draws on material previously published in Tristan J. Rogers, “Justice as Lawfulness,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2018), pp. 262–278 and Tristan J. Rogers, “Virtue Ethics and Political Authority,” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Summer 2020), pp. 303–321. Thank you to Cambridge University Press and Wiley Blackwell for permission to reprint.

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Rogers, T.J. A Virtue Politics for Liberal Democracy. J Value Inquiry (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09757-y

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