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A Theory of Just Market Exchange

  • Ricardo Andrés Guzmán
  • Michael C. MungerEmail author
Article

Any plausibly just market exchange must balance two conflicting moral considerations: non-worseness (Wertheimer, 1999) and euvoluntariness (true voluntariness; Munger, 2011). We propose an analytical theory of just market exchange that partly resolves this conflict.

Non-worseness implies that all voluntary and mutually beneficial exchanges are morally permissible. The reason is that it cannot be immoral for two negotiators to benefit one another by exchanging, if each has the right to not exchange, and is therefore not obligated to provide a benefit to the other negotiator.

Euvoluntariness, on the other hand, elaborates the idea of voluntariness to remedy deficiencies in the standard conception. Voluntariness requires that neither party to a negotiation is coerced into exchange by threat of direct harm, such as physical aggression or the disclosure of embarrassing secrets. 1 Euvoluntarinessfurther requires that the stronger party to the negotiation lacks unconscionable bargaining...

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centro de Investigación en Complejidad Social, Facultad de GobiernoUniversidad del Desarrollo, Las CondesSantiagoChile
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceDuke UniversityDurhamUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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