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Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism (600–1000): Activity, Speech and Desire

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Notes

  1. The word prekṣāvant, a close equivalent of which is the compound prekṣāpūrvakārin (“a [person] who acts [only] after a rational evaluation [of his/her act and its consequences]”), is generally translated into English as “judicious person” (McClintock) or “rational agent” (Eltschinger). The prekṣāvant thus represents, in a very general way, a model of practical rationality, a person capable of judging his own action with regard to a set of purposes (prayojana/artha), especially (though not exclusively) in relation to an expected result or “fruit” (phala) for which it constitutes the “means” (upāya/abhyupāya). This concept is widespread, with identical connotations, throughout medieval Indian philosophical literature, both Buddhist and Brahmanical, at least from the 6th century onwards. See Sara McClintock, Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation and Religious Authority (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2010), pp. 58–62, Vincent Eltschinger, “Turning Hermeneutics into Apologetics. Reasoning and Rationality under Changing Circumstances,” in Vincent Eltschinger & Helmut Krasser, eds., Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action. Proceedings of a Panel at the 14 th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1 st–5 th 2009 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013), pp. 103–134, Madeleine Biardeau, La philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra vue à partir de la Brahmasiddhi (Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969), pp. 83–85, and Hugo David, “Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (1): Maṇḍana Miśra on upadeśa and iṣṭasādhanatā”, in Eltschinger & Krasser, eds., op. cit., p. 274.

  2. Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 310–333, remains a fundamental study of the concept of dharma in Hinduism. See also the classical essay by Paul Hacker, “Dharma in Hinduismus,” Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaften 49 (1965): 93–106, the recent collective volume on “Dharma” edited by Patrick Olivelle in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32, Nos. 4–5 (2004), and Émilie Aussant’s contribution to this volume.

  3. See Robert Lingat, Les sources du droit dans le système traditionnel de l’Inde (Paris/La Haye: Mouton & Co., 1967), p. 17: “Le dharma, c’est ce qui est ferme et durable, ce qui soutient et maintient, ce qui empêche de défaillir et de choir.” Cp. Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 315–16: “[dharma] is the continuous maintaining of the social and cosmic order and [the] norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the performance of his Vedic rites and traditional duties.” The link with the root √dhṛ is acknowledged by the Indian tradition itself. See for instance Mahābhārata 12.110.11.

  4. Famously Ṛksaṃhitā 1.164.50: yajñéna yajñám ayajanta devā́s, tā́ni dhármāṇi prathamā́ṇy āsan (translation by Karl Friedrich Geldner, Der Rig-Veda (Cambridge, Mass./London/Leipzig: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 236: “Mit Opfer opferten die Götter dem Opfer. Dies waren die ersten Bräuche”). Other references are given in Halbfass, op. cit., p. 550, n. 22. The use of the plural distinguishes dhárman from another fundamental Vedic concept, that of ṛta, the “cosmic order”. On the problematic relationship between these two concepts, see Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 314–315. On the rich mythological associations of dhárma(n) in the Ṛksaṃhitā, see the quite exhaustive studies by Paul Horsch, “From Creation Myth to World Law,” and Joel Brereton, “Dhárman in the Ṛgveda,” both in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2004): 423–48 and 449–89 respectively.

  5. See Horsch, op. cit., p. 432. The Atharvaveda is the most recent of the four Vedas.

  6. There are a good number of exceptions to this rule, though. See for instance the use of the plural dharmāḥ (“the dharmas”) in the Āpastambadharmasūtra (see below), and even, as noted by Halbfass, op. cit., p. 315, in the Bhagavadgītā (1.40 and 18.66) and Yājñavalkyasmṛti (1.1). Equally significant is the choice of the plural in the 7th-century Ślokavārttika by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (codanā°– k. 285). The question whether this persistance of the plural well into the first millennium CE should be interpreted as a deliberate archaism, or rather as a sign that the alternance between plural and singular is in fact constitutive of the use of dharma(n) in Vedic and classical Sanskrit likewise, cannot be addressed here.

  7. Horsch, op. cit., p. 432.

  8. See especially Halbfass, op. cit., pp. 314–315, and Horsch, op. cit., p. 432.

  9. On the possibility that the word dharma may refer both to the act and its result, see the exceptionally clear statement by Medhātithi, the 8th/9th-century Kashmiri commentator on the Mānavadharmaśāstra (ad Manu 2.6): “The authors of the traditional texts use the word dharma sometimes in the sense of the action which forms the subject of injunctions and prohibitions and sometimes in the sense of the thing that arises from the performance of this action and persists until it has given its reward” (dharmaśabdo’yaṃ smṛtikāraiḥ kadā cid vidhiniṣedhaviṣayabhūtāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ prayujyate. kadā cit tadanuṣṭhānajanya āphalapradānāvasthāyini kasmiṃś cid arthe). Text and translation (slightly modified): Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 17.

  10. The denomination “prior” distinguishes Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, dealing with Vedic passages having a direct effect on the liturgical procedure, from “latter” exegesis (Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) or Vedānta, focused on the speculative teachings enclosed in the “end of the Veda” (vedānta), i.e. the Upaniṣads.

  11. The rules prescribing the correct execution of Vedic rites, centered on the event of the sacrifice (yajña), were systematized during the early post-Vedic period (400–200 BC, according to Louis Renou & Jean Filliozat, L’Inde Classique. Manuel des Études indiennes, Tome Premier, Avec le concours de P. Demiéville, O. Lacombe et P. Meile (Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient – Jean Maisonneuve, 1985), p. 302) in a group of “manuals” or set of aphoristic rules called the Kalpasūtras (“Aphorisms on ritual”). Although the Kalpasūtras and Mīmāṃsā share a preoccupation with Vedic ritual and a similar conceptual framework, the two kinds of literature have fundamentally distinct forms and purposes, which probably reflect their composition in different periods of Indian literary history.

  12. Although Lingat (op. cit., p. 132) still considers Medhātithi (8th/9th c.) to be the oldest commentator on Manu, we have at our disposal the work of at least one earlier commentator, Bhāruci, for whom a date as early as 600–650 was sometimes proposed. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, Bhāruci’s commentary on the Manusmṛti (the Manuśāstravivaraṇa, books 6–12). Text, translation and notes, vol. 1: the text (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975). Derrett’s dating of Bhāruci has been criticized, however, by Patrick Olivelle, “Dharmaśāstra: A Textual History,” in Timothy Lubin, Donald R. Davis Jr. and Jayanth K. Krishnan (eds.), Hinduism and Law. An introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 28–57, p. 52, n. 30.

  13. On the extensive use of Mīmāṃsā rules by commentators on Dharmaśāstra works, see in particular the important collection of essays by S.G. Moghe, Studies in Applied Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1998).

  14. See, however, the important remarks by Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra: Ancient and Mediæval Religious and Civil Law, Vol. 5, Pt. 2 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 2. ed. 1977), pp. 1178–79 on the possibility of an influence of Dharmaśāstra on Mīmāṃsā at the various stages of its history.

  15. Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 54–55. Similarly Lingat : “La méthode d’interprétation qu’elle [= Mīmāṃsā] préconise a été adoptée par les auteurs dès l’époque des sūtra, et elle sera par la suite constamment suivie par les commentateurs. On peut dire qu’elle deviendra le mode indien par excellence du raisonnement juridique” (op. cit., 23).

  16. Albrecht Wezler, for instance, claims in a recent article that “Vedic dharma and the dharma of the Dharmaśāstra originally constitute two completely separate strands” (Wezler, “Dharma in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstras,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2004): 629–54, p. 633).

  17. Although the idea of a borrowing from Mīmāṃsā into Dharmaśāstra is clearly predominant in modern scholarship on medieval Indian law, some scholars nevertheless held the contrary view. See in particular Wezler: “(…) the Mīmāṃsā in a certain sense usurped the concept of dharma – in order to label dharma as Vedic – only secondarily. (…) I assume that the Mīmāṃsā was stimulated to apply this term to the content of the Vedic prescription only by the Dharmaśāstra” (ibid., p. 633). A full discussion of Wezler’s arguments lies beyond the scope of the present study.

  18. For a few examples of aphorisms found both in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras and in collections of ritual dating back to the immediately post-Vedic period, see Jean-Marie Verpoorten, Mīmāṃsā Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), p. 3.

  19. See for instance Verpoorten, op. cit., p. 8. No consensus has been reached so far concerning Śabara’s date. Some recent chronologies even consider, following a suggestion by Erich Frauwallner, that Śabara could have lived as late as the 6th century (see for instance Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 2: An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (codanāsūtra) (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), p. 20). Although this date seems to me less probable especially in consideration of Śabara’s relationship to Bhartṛhari, this is not the place to discuss that point in detail.

  20. Early grammarians like Pāṇini (4th c. BC) and Patañjali (around 200 BC) apparently had some acquaintance with Mīmāṃsā. See Louis Renou & Jean Filliozat, L’Inde classique. Manuel des Études indiennes, Tome Second, Avec le concours de P. Demiéville, O. Lacombe et P. Meile (Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 2001, reprint from the 2nd edition, 1953), Kane, op. cit., pp. 1153–54, and Verpoorten, op. cit., p. 3. The Vārāhagṛhyasūtra (6.32), possibly from the 1st century BC, also mentions mīmāṃsā, along with kalpa (“sacrificial procedure”), among the various sciences to be learnt by an expert in sacrifice (yajñika). The mention of Mīmāṃsā is, interestingly enough, one of the most commonly advanced arguments in favour of the relatively late dating of this collection of “domestic” ritual aphorisms (see Jan Gonda, The Ritual Sūtras, Vol. 1.2 of A History of Indian Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), pp. 479, 600).

  21. Similar difficulties arise with the following claim by Olivelle: “The tradition of Vedic exegesis and hermeneutics known as Mīmāṃsā exerted a strong influence on the Dharmaśāstric tradition, and gradually that influence led to the dominance of the Veda as the principal if not the single source of dharma within the theological understanding of the term” (“Dharmaśāstra: a textual history”, p. 32). There is actually no strong evidence against the assumption that the idea of the Veda as the only source of dharma might have been initiated in the Dharmaśāstra tradition itself, and later adopted by Mīmāṃsā. In the same way, the significant statement that “the lost readings [in Brāhmaṇa passages] […] are inferred from usage” (utsannāḥ pāṭhāḥ prayogād anumīyante), found in Āpastamba’s Dharmasūtra (1.12.10), is interpreted by Olivelle as exemplifying “the Mīmāṃsā concept of anumitaśruti” (ibid,. p. 33). One does not find this principle voiced before Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.2 (in Śabara’s interpretation). Thus, unless one proposes to date the latter before the 3rd century BC, I can see no reason to admit that this principle is directly borrowed from Mīmāṃsā.

  22. See Śābarabhāṣya ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1 (vol. 2 p. 70.2–71.1).

  23. See Śābarabhāṣya ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.1.15, where Śabara criticizes the practice of selling one’s daughter, even though such a practice is considered “traditional” (smārta), on the ground that it contradicts revealed texts prescribing the gift (dāna) of a daughter. On this passage, see Kane, op. cit., p. 1178.

  24. See Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7 (text: Kunio Harikai, “Sanskrit text of the Tantravārttika. Adhyāya 1, Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa 4–6. Collated with six Manuscripts,” South Asian Classical Studies 4 (2009): 359–396; tr. Ganganatha Jha, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Tantravārttika, a Commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini, translated into English. Volume 1 (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1924)).

  25. On some striking similarities of early Dharmasūtras (especially that of Āpastamba, the earliest Hindu juridical text that has come down to us) with Mīmāṃsā, see already Kane, op. cit., pp. 1154–55.

  26. See already Lingat: “En fait, les textes védiques contiennent fort peu de règles de dharma” (op. cit., p. 22). The scarcity of references to dharma in later Vedic literature was stressed, at a more recent date, by Patrick Olivelle, who proposed to link the renewed interest in the concept of dharma in the 4th/5th century BC within Brahmanism with the appropriation of this concept around the same time by ascetic religions, especially by Buddhism. See his “Power of Words: The Ascetic Appropriation and the Semantic Evolution of Dharma,” in Language, Texts, and Society: Explorations in Ancient Indian Culture and Religion (Florence: University of Firenze Press, 2005), p. 121–135 and “Dharmaśāstra: A Textual History,” op. cit., p. 31.

  27. See Richard W. Lariviere, “Dharmaśāstra, Custom, ‘Real Law’ and ‘Apocryphal’ Smṛtis,” Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 32 (2004): 611–27, p. 616. Lariviere’s article offers a well balanced view of the dialectics of custom and Vedic standards in the constitution of Dharmaśāstra. It convincingly describes how the integration of local customs can be seen as a way to “Sanskritise” these customs, and integrate them in the general Brahmanical world-view. Hence, in Lariviere’s view, Dharmaśāstra can present at the same time a “record of local social norms and traditional standards of behaviour” (p. 612) and harmonize it without contradiction with the view that all dharma is in accordance with the Veda.

  28. Manu 2.6: vedo’khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām | ācāraś caiva sādhūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca ||. Tr.: Patrick Olivelle, The Law Code of Manu. A New Translation Based on the Critical Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 23.

  29. Manu 2.7: yaḥ kaś cit kasya cid dharmo manunā parikīrtitaḥ | sa sarvo’bhihito vede sarvajñānamayo hi saḥ ||. Tr.: Olivelle, op. cit.

  30. For a recent account of their chronology, see Olivelle, “Dharmaśāstra: A Textual History,” op. cit., p. 57.

  31. See GDhSū 1.1–2: vedo dharmamūlam | tadvidāṃ ca smṛtiśīle; “The source of dharma is the Veda, as well as the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda” (tr. Patrick Olivelle, Dharmasūtras. The Law Codes of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, Annotated Text and Translation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), p. 121).

  32. See BDhSū 1.1–4: upadiṣṭo dharmaḥ prativedam | tasyānu vyākhyāsyāmaḥ | smārto dvitīyaḥ | tṛtīyaḥ śiṣṭāgamaḥ; “The Law is taught in each Veda, in accordance with which we will explain it. What is given in the tradition is the second, and the conventions of cultured people are the third”; VDhSū 1.4–6: śrutismṛtivihito dharmaḥ | tadalābhe śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam; “The Law is set forth in the Vedas and the Traditional Texts. When these do not address an issue, the practice of cultured people becomes authoritative” (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., pp. 197 and 351). This tripartite classification of sources of dharma is also found in other literary sources, not directly related to the Dharmasūtras or even to the wider field of Dharmaśāstra. See for instance Mahābhārata 13.129.5 and 3.198.78.

  33. Śābarabhāṣya ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1 (vol. 2 p. 69.11).

  34. See Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1–2/1.3.15–23 and Śābarabhāṣya thereon. See also Śabara’s unambiguous statement at the beginning of the “Chapter on Holi” (holākādhikaraṇa – ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.15): anumānāt smṛter ācārāṇāṃ ca prāmāṇyam iṣyate; “We accept, on the basis of the inference [of a Vedic source], that traditional texts and customs are a means of knowing [dharma]” (vol. 2 p. 171.6).

  35. See Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7 (discourse of an opponent): sadācārapramāṇatvaṃ manvādibhir api smṛtam | ātmatuṣṭiḥ smṛtānyā tair dharme (…); “Even Manu and other [authors of Smṛtis] teach that good conduct is a means of knowing dharma, and still another [means of knowledge] is taught, [namely] self-contentment.” It is still uncertain whether Śabara, probably writing in the 4th century, had any knowledge of the Mānavadharmaśāstra. The centrality of Manu’s code seems, in any case, to be a novelty of Kumārila’s thought. On this point, see Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, “Kumārila and Medhātithi on the Authority of Codified Sources of dharma,” in François Voegeli, Vincent Eltschinger, Danielle Feller, Maria Piera Candotti, Bogdan Diaconescu & Malhar Kulkarni (eds.), Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 643–81, pp. 654–58.

  36. See Manu 2.10ab: śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ; “‘Scripture’ should be recognized as ‘Veda’, and ‘tradition’ as ‘Law Treatise’” (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., p. 23). Brick explains in the following way the distinction between smṛti and ācāra in the older Dharmasūtras, in particular that of Āpastamba: “(…) one might interpret smṛti as the standards of right conduct that people remember from the past and become conscious of as the occasion arises. (…) It would denote what people articulate as the time-honored norm, whereas ācāra would denote what people actually practice” (David Brick, “Transforming Tradition into Texts: the Early Development of smṛti,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 34 (2006): 287–302, p. 293).

  37. ĀpDhSū 1.1–3: athātaḥ sāmayācārikān dharmān vyākhyāsyāmaḥ | dharmajñasamayaḥ pramāṇam | vedāś ca (tr. Olivelle, Dharmasūtras, op. cit., p. 25). See also ĀpDhSū 1.20.6–7: na dharmādharmau carata āvaṃ sva iti | na devagandharvā na pitara ity ācakṣate ’yaṃ dharma iti | yat tv āryāḥ kriyamānaṃ praśaṃsanti, sa dharmaḥ, yad garhante, so’dharmaḥ; “Dharma and adharma do not go around saying, ‘Here we are!’ Nor do gods, Gandharvas, or ancestors declare, ‘This is dharma and that is adharma.’ An activity that Āryas praise is righteous, and what they deplore is unrighteous” (tr.: ibid., p. 57). See also the similar statement in the collection of Gṛhyasūtras (aphorisms of the domestic ritual) ascribed to the same Āpastamba (1.1). Āpastamba’s conception of Dharma apparently forms the basis for P. Hacker’s classical understanding of this concept: “Der Dharma, seinem Inhalt nach auf die Kasten und Lebensstände bezogen, den ganzen Bereich von Moral, Kultus, Recht und Sitte umgreifend, durch seinen Vollzug jenseitiges Heil wirkend, ist nicht aus einem philosophischen Prinzip oder einem religiösen Ursprung ableitbar, sondern nur empirisch feststellbar, sei es aus dem Veda, sei es aus dem Consensus der Guten mit Rücksicht auf den geographischen Ort” (Hacker, op. cit., p. 503). Āpastamba does not stand alone in this revaluation of custom against the Vedic framework. A similar attitude is reflected, for instance, in the following verse from the Mahābhārata: ācārasaṃbhavo dharmo dharmād vedāḥ samutthitāḥ | vedair yajñāḥ samutpannā yajñair devāḥ pratiṣṭhitāḥ || “Dharma has its origin in custom; the Vedas are established from dharma; sacrifices are produced by the Vedas; the gods are established by the sacrifices” (3.149.28; quoted in Timothy Lubin, “Indic conceptions of authority,” in Lubin, Davis Jr. and Krishnan (eds.), op. cit., 137–53, p. 141).

  38. The classical definition of a śiṣṭa is found in the Dharmasūtra of Baudhāyana. See BDhSū 1.5–6: śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigatamatsarā nirahaṅkārāḥ kumbhīdhanyā alolupā dambhadarpalobhamohakrodhavivarjitāḥ ‘dharmeṇādhigato yeṣāṃ vedaḥ saparibṛṃhaṇaḥ | śiṣṭās tadanumānajñāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetavaḥ’; “Now, cultured people are those who are free from envy and pride, possess just a jarful of grain, and are free from covetousness, hypocrisy, arrogance, greed, folly, and anger. As it is said: ‘Cultured people are those who have studied the Veda together with its supplements in accordance with the Law, know how to draw inferences from them, and are able to adduce as proofs express Vedic texts.’” (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., p. 197). Compare this description to similar ones given by Āpastamba (ĀpDhSū 1.20.6sq.).

  39. Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7: ke śiṣṭā ye sadācārāḥ, sadācārāś ca tatkṛtāḥ | itītaretarādhīnanirṇayatvād anirṇayaḥ || (…) naiva teṣāṃ sadācāranimittā śiṣṭatā matā | sākṣād vihitakāritvāc chiṣṭatve sati tadvacaḥ || (text: Harikai, op. cit., pp. 371–373).

  40. VDhSū 1.8–10: prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād udak pāriyātrād dakṣiṇena himavataḥ | uttareṇa vindhyasya | ye dharmā ye cācārās te sarve pratyetavyāḥ | (tr. Olivelle, op. cit., p. 351).

  41. The fact of residing in the Āryāvarta (āryāvartanivās[a]) is mentioned by Kumārila as a limitation of the quality of being a śiṣṭa in the section of his Tantravārttika dealing with “good conduct” (sadācāra) (ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7 – Harikai, op. cit., p. 373). The only indication given by Kumārila on the delimitation of the Āryāvarta, the “disappearance of the Sarasvatī” (sarasvatīvināśa) in the West, is closer to Vasiṣṭha’s description of the Āryāvarta, since Manu describes the latter as “extending from the eastern to the western sea” (2.22). No mention of an Āryāvarta is found, as far as I know, in Śabara’s Bhāṣya.

  42. Davis, The Spirit of Hindu Law, p. 32. See also Olivelle’s translation of Manu 2.6 (quoted above).

  43. Lingat, op. cit., p. 20: “le contentement intérieur, nous dirions plutôt l’assentiment de la conscience”.

  44. Ibid.: “Mais le contentement intérieur (…), si c’est bien une source du dharma, ne nous paraît pas tout à fait à sa place ici, à la suite de sources dont l’autorité est extérieure à l’homme”.

  45. This point was made especially clear by Donald R. Davis, Jr., “On Ātmatuṣṭi as a Source of Dharma,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 127, No. 3 (2007): 279–296. See also Davis, The Spirit of Hindu Law, op. cit., pp. 31–33.

  46. Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7: etena vaidikānantadharmadhīsaṃskṛtātmanām | ātmatuṣṭeḥ pramāṇatvaṃ prasiddhaṃ dharmaśuddhaye || tathaiva bahukālābhyastavedatadarthajñānāhitasaṃskārāṇāṃ vedaniyatamārgānusāripratibhānāṃ nonmārgeṇa pratibhānaṃ saṃbhavati (…). yathā rūmāyāṃ lavaṇākareṣu meror yathā vojjvalarukmabhūmau | yaj jāyate tanmayam eva tat syāt tathā bhaved vedavidātmatuṣṭiḥ || (text: Harikai, op. cit., p. 374 – I do not translate etena in the first sentence).

  47. Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7: vaidikavāsanājanitatvād veda eva sa bhavati (text: Harikai, op. cit., p. 374). It is interesting to note that the same image of a piece of wood extracted from a salt-mine is used by Kumārila to define the relationship of Mīmāṃsā with the Veda in an oft-quoted fragment of his now lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā: mīmāṃsāsaṃjñakas tarkaḥ sarvavedasamudbhavaḥ | so ’to vedo rumāprāptakāṣṭhādilavaṇātmavat ||; “The rational system known by the name ‘exegesis’ (mīmāṃsā) is entirely born from the Veda; therefore, it is Veda, just as a piece of wood extracted from [the salt-mines of] Rumā is [itself] salty” (as quoted in Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā – p. 52).

  48. Kumārila, Ślokavārttika (codanā°) 242cd–243ab.

  49. The Sanskit word karman, meaning “action” or “movement” in general, is also a very common designation for the sacrifice (otherwise referred to as yāga/yajña), which, according to its most common description, is nothing but a certain type of movement consisting of the abandonment (tyāga) of a certain substance (dravya) into the sacrificial fire, addressed to a particular deity (devatā).

  50. Śābarabhāṣya ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2: codanā iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhuḥ; “They say that an injunction is a statement provoking a [certain] action” (text: Erich Frauwallner, Materialen zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā (Wien: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1968), p. 16); Ślokavārttika (codanā°) 3cd: pravartakaṃ vākyaṃ śāstre ’smin codanocyate; “In this science (śāstra), a sentence provoking [a certain action] is called an ‘injunction’ (codanā)” (text: Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (codanāsūtra). (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), p. 1); Ślokavārttika (vākya°) 275ab: anuṣṭheye hi viṣaye vidhiḥ puṃsāṃ pravartakaḥ; “for an injunction is what provokes the people’s [action] towards an object that has to be undertaken” (p. 921).

  51. Exact identification of the various “Vedic” sentences quoted as examples by Brahmanical exegetes is often problematic, and many of them cannot be found in their exact form in the text of the Veda as it has come down to us. All sentences quoted here are found either in the work of Śabara or of his commentators. For an (often tentative) identification of their sources, see Damodar Vishnu Garge, Citations in Śābara-bhāṣya: a Study (Poona: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, 1952) and James Benson (ed. and trans.), Mahādeva Vedāntin. Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha. A Compendium of the Principles of Mīmāṃsā (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010).

  52. See for instance Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha § 225–26 (translated in Franklin Edgerton, The Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevī: A treatise on the Mīmāṃsā system by Āpadeva (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986)).

  53. Richard W. Lariviere, “Adhikāra – Right and Responsibility,” in Mohammad Ali Jazayery and Werner Winter (eds.), Language and Cultures: Studies in Honor of E.C. Polomé (Berlin/New York/Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 359–364. Lariviere’s argument certainly goes too far, though, in unilaterally excluding optionality from adhikāra in the ritual domain. In fact, if permanent (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) rites are indeed mandatory, no sacrificer (unless he has already started it) is forced to undertake (i.e. incurs loss of status if he does not undertake) those rites belonging to the category of optional (kāmya) rites. Hence, it seems to me excessive to say that “there was nothing optional about any ritual for which one was an adhikārin” (p. 363).

  54. See Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 2, p. 20. For a discussion of Maṇḍana’s date, see also Hugo David, “Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta”, p. 273, n. 5.

  55. The only study specifically devoted to the Vidhiviveka that has appeared to date is the very short and schematic monograph by Kanchana Natarajan, The Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra: Understanding Vedic Injunctions (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1995). See also Elliot M. Stern, Vidhivivekaḥ of Maṇḍana Miśraḥ, with commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśraḥ and supercommentaries Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and Svaditaṅkaraṇī of Parameśvaraḥ. Critical and annotated edition: the pūrvapakṣaḥ [Sanskrit text] (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1988) and David, op. cit. Maṇḍana’s text has not yet been translated in any language. Many topics dealt with in the Vidhiviveka find an echo in the second book of Maṇḍana’s later Brahmasiddhi, the “Section on Commandment” (Niyogakāṇḍa).

  56. On the various meanings of the word vidhi in use by Maṇḍana’s time, see David, op. cit., pp. 273–274.

  57. The concept of bhāvanā, though already in use in Śabara’s Bhāṣya, received its definitive shape in Kumārila’s Tantravārttika. Maṇḍana himself devoted a whole treatise, the Bhāvanāviveka (“An enquiry into effectuation”) to a precise definition of effectuation, partially disagreeing with Kumārila’s understanding of this concept. See Erich Frauwallner, “Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 45 (1938), 212–52, Kei Kataoka, “Scripture, Men and Heaven. Causal structure in Kumārila’s action-theory of bhāvanā,” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2001): 10–13, and Hugo David, “A Contribution of Vedānta to the History of Mīmāṃsā. Prakāśātman’s Interpretation of ‘Verbal Effectuation’ (śabdabhāvanā),” in Nina Mirnig, Péter-Dániel Szántó and Michael Williams (eds.), Puṣpikā: Tracing Ancient India through Texts and Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2013), 79–105.

  58. ViV 2 (svavṛtti – introduction): sa khalu śabdabhedo vā liṅādis tadvyāpārātiśayo vā pravṛttihetur upeyate ’rthabhedo vā, yadabhidhānāc chabdo’pi tathā vyapadeśyaḥ (S 66.1–70.1 [≈ G 4.1–2]).

  59. Later texts tend to concentrate exclusively on this third hypothesis, and also generally take the problem the other way round, explaining the functioning of injunctive language on the basis of a preexisting theory of action, elaborated independently. This might explain the paradigmatic role played, in later Brahmanical texts on action, by the child (bāla) who has not yet learnt how to speak, as in the following passage of the Vākyārthamātṛkā (2.4 cd – svavṛtti) by the 9th/10th-century philosopher Śālikanātha: avyutpannena <corr: vyutpannena Ed> bālena yad ātmani pravṛttikāraṇatayā pratītam <corr: pratītī Ed> , tad eva vyutpannasyāpīti kalpyate, nānyat; “A child who cannot use language understands that what he perceives in his own self as the cause of his activity is also [the cause of the activity] of an [adult] who can use language” (S 419.7–9). It is on the basis of this inference based on an analogy between his inner states and those of the person he observes in a situation of interlocution (vyavahāra) that the child is able, according to Indian theoreticians, to determine the object (artha) referred to by injunctive suffixes (liṅādi).

  60. On the specific difficulties entailed by the second hypothesis, see David, “A contribution of Vedānta,” op. cit..

  61. In technical terms this means that speech functions as an “efficient cause” (kārakahetu), just as fire causes smoke, and not as a “cause leading to knowledge” (jñāpakahetu) or “means of knowledge” (pramāṇa), as smoke (to keep the same example) is the cause of our knowledge of a fire we cannot see.

  62. The device consisting in developing the position of an objector or “preliminary thesis” (pūrvapakṣa) before introducing the “final thesis” (siddhānta) of the author is one of the most common ways of proceeding in Sanskrit philosophical texts. The preliminary thesis can, of course, represent the actual position of a contemporary or past philosopher, but this need not be the case.

  63. This restriction of the injunctive force or “verbal efficiency” (śabdabhāvanā) to the verbal suffix (ākhyāta) alone is one of the great achievements of Kumārila’s theory of injunction. See Frauwallner, op. cit., Kataoka, op. cit., Elisa Freschi, Duty, Language and Exegesis in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (including an Edition and Translation of Rāmānujācārya’s Tantrarahasya, Śāstraprameyapariccheda) (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), and David, op. cit..

  64. Interestingly enough, the concept of “habit” (abhyāsa) is not introduced by Maṇḍana directly, but only through a quote from the 5th-century grammarian Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya 2.117). See ViV 2 (svavṛtti) S 118.1–19.1 (= G 8.4–5). An analysis of the possible connections between the present hypothesis and Bhartṛhari’s own theory of language lies beyond the scope of the present study.

  65. On the concept of “cause leading to knowledge” (jñāpakahetu), see above n. 61.

  66. ViV 2 (svavṛtti): nanu śaṅkhadhvanivad etat syāt. yathā hi śaṅkhaśabdāt pravartitavyam ity upayuktasaṃvida eva pravartante, netare. na ca śaṅkhaśabdaḥ pravṛtter abhidhāyakaḥ, anyasya vā kasya cit pravṛttihetoḥ, yena jñāpakaḥ syāt (S 87.1–88.2 [≈ G 6.1–3]).

  67. Although no philosopher has so far been identified holding a similar position, this does not mean that such a thinker never existed, as this might only be a symptom of our still very insufficient knowledge of early Mīmāṃsā.

  68. On Śālikanātha’s date, see below § 2.2.

  69. See Vākyārthamātṛkā 4cd (svavṛtti): tena śabda eva pravṛttihetubhūto vidhiḥ, tadvyāpāro veti nirastaṃ bhavati (…). atimandatayā cemau pakṣau na sākṣād upanyasya nirastau; “By the preceding [argument], we [also] refute [the idea that] vidhi, the cause of an activity, is nothing but the speech-unit [in itself] or its operation (…). And these two theses are not exposed and refuted directly, because of their excessive weakness.” (S 419.10–12). The same hypothesis is found, at a much later date, in a passage of Rāmānujācārya’s Tantrarahasya (15th–17th c.?). See Freschi, op. cit., pp. 30–31 and 164–167. Freschi’s tentative identification of this thesis as “the common sense view of the yajñikas, the performers of the sacrifice” (ibid., p. 30) is attractive, but not entirely convincing. I find it more plausible that Rāmānuja, who generally relies on Śālikanātha’s Vākyārthamātṛkā, does so in that case also, and borrows this idea directly from his predecessor who himself relies on its (first?) formulation in Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka.

  70. This principle can be illustrated as follows: an efficient cause (kāraka) like fire produces its effect (say, smoke) even without any knowledge of its relation to something else. On the contrary, smoke, a cause leading to knowledge (jñāpaka) when it is used as an inferential sign, produces its effect (the knowledge of an unseen fire) only when its relation to fire is known. In the same way, a speech-unit (śabda) normally produces its effect only after its relation (saṅgati/saṃbandha) with an object (artha) has been learnt.

  71. ViV 2 (svavṛtti): jñāpakaṃ ca jñānam apekṣate, liṅādisvarūpaṃ ca pravṛtteḥ kārakam ity anupayuktasaṃvido’pi pravṛttiprasaṅgaḥ (…) na hi śaṅkhadhvaniḥ pravṛttyupayuktasaṅgatitayā pravṛttikāraṇam (S 82.1–91.1 [≈ G 5.5–6.4]).

  72. Manu 11.44. The full verse, which opens the section on penances of the Mānavadharmaśāstra, reads as follows: akurvan vihitaṃ karma ninditaṃ ca samācaran | prasajaṃś cendriyārtheṣu prāyaścittīyate naraḥ ||; “When a man fails to carry out prescribed acts, performs disapproved acts, and is attached to the sensory objects, he is subject to a penance” (tr. Olivelle, The Law Code of Manu, op. cit., p. 193).

  73. ViV 2 (svavṛtti): śabdasvātantrye ca niyogataḥ pravṛttiḥ syāt. tathā ca ‘akurvan vihitaṃ karma’ ity aviṣayaṃ syāt. na hi balavadanilasalilaughanudyamānasyevecchāpi tantraṃ puruṣasya (S 78.1–82.1 [≈ G 5.2–5]).

  74. On the structure of this section, see the brief summary given in Stern, op. cit., pp. 17–45. Seven categories of “objects” (artha) are examined in ViV 5–14 (ViV 15–25 is a digression in Maṇḍana’s course of argument). These are: 1. three so-called “properties of the speaker” (prayoktṛdharma): command, request and permission (k. 5); 2. “incitement” (pravartanā), understood as their common denominator (k. 5); 3. the “fruit” (phala) of the prescribed action (k. 6); 4. the “act” (karman) in itself, (k. 7); 5. “effectuation, provided that [its] particular [relationship to] time is not acknowledged” (bhāvanā […] aparāmṛṣṭakālabhedā) (k. 8); 6. “one’s own relationship with the action, whose relationship [with an agent] has not been obtained” (aprāptasaṃbandhayā kriyayātmanaḥ saṃbandha[ḥ]) (k. 9–11); 7. “commandment” (niyoga), in the specific sense given to this term by the 7th-century Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara (k. 12–14).

  75. On Maṇḍana’s conception of desire (icchā) as opposed to passion (rāga), born from an excessive attachment to illusory qualities of an object, see the excellent remarks by Biardeau (La philosophie de Maṇḍana Miśra, op. cit., pp. 14–15).

  76. I do not dwell here on this idea and its development by the 10th-century commentator Vācaspati Miśra (950–1000), as I have dealt with this topic in greater detail elsewhere. See Hugo David, “Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta,” pp. 304–305.

  77. Manu 2.2/4: kāmātmatā na praśastā na caivehāsty akāmatā | kāmyo hi vedādhigamaḥ karmayogaś ca vaidikaḥ || (…) akāmasya kriyā kā cid dṛśyate neha karhi cit | yad yad dhi kurute kiṃ cit tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam || Tr.: Olivelle, op. cit., p. 23. See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavṛtti): tathā coktam – ‘kāmātmatā na praśastā na caivehāsty akāmatā’ (p. 3.24–25).

  78. See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavṛtti) p. 3.23.

  79. See Brahmasiddhi 1.1 (svavṛtti) p. 3.17–25. Tr. Biardeau (op. cit. p. 144).

  80. ViV 28: puṃso neṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsv anyaḥ pravartakaḥ | pravṛttihetuṃ dharmaṃ ca pravadanti pravartanām || (G 173.2–3 (see also Stern, op. cit., p. 1628)).

  81. ĀpDhSū 1.20.1–4: nemaṃ laukikam arthaṃ puraskṛtya dharmāṃś caret | niṣphalā hy abhyudaye bhavanti | tad yathāmre phalārthe nirmite chāyā gandha ity anūtpadyete | evaṃ dharmaṃ caryamāṇam arthā anūtpadyante | no ced anūtpadyante, na dharmahānir bhavati | Tr.: Olivelle, Dharmasūtras, op. cit., p. 57 (modified).

  82. This aspect of Āpastamba’s thought is well seized by Paul Hacker in his already mentioned article on the meaning of dharma (Hacker, op. cit., p. 97). It would, however, be a mistake to consider, as Hacker leads one to think, that this opinion would be representative of ancient Hindu conceptions of dharma generally.

  83. See ViV 26 and svavṛtti (G 169.2–3). Translation from Hugo David, “Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis,” op. cit., 294–295.

  84. Mention must be made here of the famous Bhagavadgītā (see e.g. 2.71), where the god Kṛṣṇa, the main protagonist, repeatedly urges his interlocutor Arjuna to act “having renounced all desires” (sarvān kāmān vihāya), “without attachment” (niḥspṛha), etc. For a modern defence of desireless action based on the Gītā and other, later Sanskrit texts, see Christopher Framarin, Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy (London/New York: Routledge, 2009), who does not, however, take into account the materials here under consideration. For a recent critique of Framarin’s ideas, see Simon Brodbeck, “Review of Framarin,” Religious Studies, Vol. 46 (2010): 135–40.

  85. Śālikanātha’s date is still unsettled. Verpoorten proposes to date him “between 800 and 950” (op. cit., p. 38), while the more recent chronology of Mīmāṃsā in Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 2 places him around 900 (p. 20).

  86. The “Prābhākara” school of Mīmāṃsā, which derives its name from that of its founder, Prabhākara Miśra (7th c.), is one of the two main sub-schools of classical Brahmanical exegesis after Śabara, the other being the “Bhāṭṭa” school named after Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, likely to be Prabhākara’s contemporary. Although Maṇḍana’s affiliation to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is overall problematic, he is no doubt closer to Kumārila’s ideas than to those of Prabhākara, one of his most regular targets in the Vidhiviveka and Brahmasiddhi.

  87. A very clear exposition of Śālikanātha’s and later Prābhākaras’ theory of the “unprecedented obligation” (apūrvakārya) can be found in Freschi, op. cit., pp. 45–62. Unfortunately, no reliable translation of Śālikanātha’s treatise in a European language has yet been published.

  88. The distinction between “permanent” (nitya) and “occasional” (naimittika) rites, mentioned by Śālikanātha in the passage quoted below, is of little relevance to the present discussion. Unlike a daily rite like the Agnihotra, that must be performed again and again, an “occasional” rite is, for instance, the particular ritual performed on the birth of a son, which should be performed only on that occasion.

  89. On the notion of adhikāra (“qualification”, “duty”) and its correlate, the adhikārin (“qualified [person]”, “person in charge [of a certain act]”), see above (§ 2 – introduction).

  90. On the “principle of [the sacrifice named] Viśvajit” (viśvajinnyāya), see Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa § 117 (translated in Edgerton, The Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevī).

  91. There has been some scholarly debate on this topic since the publication, in 1926, of a significant article by the Russian scholar Theodor Stcherbatsky, boldly comparing Prabhākara’s (in reality, Śālikanātha’s) conception of an “unprecedented obligation” (apūrvakārya) with Kant’s categorical imperative: “Wir können in Anlehnung an die ethischen Richtungen in der modernen Philosophie die Richtung Kumārilas als die Lehre vom problematischen Imperativ und die Schule Prabhākaras als die des kategorischen Imperativs charakterisieren” (Stcherbatsky, “Über die Nyāyakaṇikā des Vācaspatimiśra und die indische Lehre vom kategorischen Imperativ,” in W. Kirfel (ed.), Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festgabe Hermann Jacobi zum 75. Geburtstag (Bonn: F. Klopp, 1926), 369–380, p. 373; partial English translation in Hajime Nakamura, “Problem of categorical imperative in the philosophy of Prābhākara school: a brief note,” in R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā. D r Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), 169–83). A radically different view has been put forward recently by E. Freschi, who claims precisely the opposite, considering (mostly on the basis of a late rendering of Śālikanātha’s ideas) that desire is as central to the Prābhākara conception of the norm as it is to other Mīmāṃsakas: “desire is the motive of (ritual) action. Indeed, there cannot be (ritual) action without desire” (Freschi, op. cit., p. 118). Non-optional rites are no exception to this general rule, for “fixed rituals [nityakarman – HD] are to be performed throughout one’s life because their agent is identified as ‘The One who is desirous of heaven’” (ibid., p. 119). Although I generally agree with Freschi’s analysis of the Prābhākara concept of a “specification of the person qualified [for the act]” (adhikāriviśeṣaṇa) (see below), which indeed rules out any plausible comparison with Kant’s categorical imperative understood as a universal principle of morality, I cannot follow her in that last conclusion, which seems to be directly refuted by Śālikanātha’s own explicit statements, as we shall see. This, of course, does not mean that Śālikanātha’s position should be extended to the “Prābhākara school” taken globally, nor that it should necessarily be held fairly to represent the opinion of Prabhākara himself. For an extensive discussion of this topic in Prabhākara’s work, see Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Der “Organismus” des urheberlosen Veda. Eine Studie der Niyoga-Lehre Prabhākaras mit ausgewählten Übersetzungen der Bṛhatī (Vienna: University of Vienna, 1997), pp. 173–80.

  92. In using the adjective “unprecedented” (apūrva), Śālikanātha means to say that the obligation (kārya) conveyed by a Vedic injunction cannot be known (logically “preceded”) by any other means of knowledge, like perception, inference, or even non-Vedic speech. See Vākyārthamātṛkā 2.25 (S 441.3–4).

  93. See Vākyārthamātṛkā 2.30 (svavṛtti): nanv evaṃ bhavatu kāmyeṣv apūrvakāryābhidhānaṃ liṅādīnām. nityanaimittikaniṣedhādhikāreṣu katham? – na hi teṣu <kathaṃ? – na hi teṣu S: katham teṣu M> phalodayaṃ prābhākarā anumanyante. na hi phalaṃ phalatayānvīyate, kiṃ tv adhikāriviśeṣaṇatayā. labdhe tu jīvanādāv adhikāriviśeṣaṇe kiṃ phalānveṣaṇena? na ca phalam antareṇa pravṛttyasaṃbhavaḥ, svasaṃbandhikāryāvagamamātrāyattatvāt pravṛtteḥ. nirapekṣāc <nirapekṣāc S: nirapekṣaḥ M> chabdāt phalam antareṇāpi svasaṃbandhikāryāvagamaḥ, tāvanmātrasya loke pravṛttihetutvāvagamāt. kāryāvagamotpādanāyaiva phalam upayujyata ity uktam (S 445.1–7/M 191.12–21).

  94. I borrow this formulation, not found in Śālikanātha’s work, from a passage of Maṇḍana Miśra’s Vidhiviveka proposing a rendering of Prabhākara’s ideas. See ViV 12 (svavṛtti) S 299.1 (G 35.7–8).

  95. See ViV 12 (svavṛtti) S 299.1 (G 35.8).

  96. Although Prakāśātman does not say so explicitly, it seems necessary, in order to preserve the coherence of his reasoning, to suppose that only some of the people standing in front of the door are desirous of a village, not all of them.

  97. Śābdanirṇaya 59 (svavṛtti): nanu kāminaḥ pravṛttyupadeśaḥ kāmopāye bhavati. – na, atatsādhane’pi phalakāmanāyā niyojyaviśeṣaṇatvadarśanāt, yathā grāmādikāmeṣv anekeṣu dvāraṃ pratyāsanneṣu kaś cid bhojayitā vijñātenaiva viśeṣaṇena niyojyaṃ viśinaṣṭy anyeṣāṃ nivṛttaye: “grāmakāma, āgaccha!” iti. na tatrāgamanaṃ grāmasādhanaṃ. Text: Hugo David, La parole comme moyen de connaissance. Recherches sur l’épi­stémologie de la connaissance verbale et la théorie de l’exégèse dans l’Advaita Ve­dānta (Unpublished PhD thesis, École pratique des hautes études (Section des Scien­ces Religieuses), Paris, 2012) (≈ GS 58.15–20).

  98. See Bṛhatī (Prabhākara) 1.1.25: tataś ca kāryābhidhāyitā loke niyogasyāvagatā “ācāryacoditaḥ karomi” iti; “And this is why we perceive in our worldly experience (loke) that a command (niyoga) expresses an obligation, [as when a child thinks] ‘I am to do as the master ordered me’” (p. 386.2–387.1).

  99. Francis X. Clooney, Thinking Ritually: Rediscovering the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Jaimini (Vienna: University of Vienna, 1990), p. 160–61.

  100. For a relatively detailed discussion of Clooney’s ideas focussing on Prabhākara’s conception of the apūrva, see Yoshimizu, op. cit., pp. 55–100, which basically adheres to Clooney’s reading of Prabhākara.

  101. See Tattvacintāmaṇi vol. 4.2 (p. 1–18).

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Correspondence to Hugo David.

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This article is the partial outcome of the project “Speech and action in early Brahmanism” carried out at the University of Cambridge with the generous support of the Royal Society of Great Britain (Newton International Fellowship). I thank Émilie Aussant, Jonathan Duquette, Elisa Ganser, Philipp Maas and Vincenzo Vergiani for their valuable comments on a previous version of this essay. Unless otherwise specified all translations from the Sanskrit are mine.

References to Primary Sources and Abbreviations

References to Primary Sources and Abbreviations

1.1 Abbreviations

ĀpDhSū = Āpastambadharmasūtra.

GDhSū = Gautamadharmasūtra.

BDhSū = Baudhāyanadharmasūtra.

Manu = Mānavadharmaśāstra.

ViV = Vidhiviveka.

VDhSū = Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra.

1.2 Sanskrit Texts

Āpastambadharmasūtra [= ĀpDhSū]. See Patrick Olivelle, Dharmasūtras. The Law Codes of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, Annotated Text and Translation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).

Gautamadharmasūtra [= GDhSū]. See Olivelle, Dharmasūtras, op. cit.

Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya:

Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, ed., Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, 6 vol. (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, The Vrajajivan Prachyabharati Granthamala 47, 1990), Reprint of the 1st ed. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1888–1901).

Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. See Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Kunio Harikai, “Sanskrit text of the Tantravārttika. Adhyāya 1, Pāda 3, Adhikaraṇa 4–6. Collated with six Manuscripts,” South Asian Classical Studies 4 (2009): 359–396.

Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra:

Anantalal Thakur, ed., Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Nyāyacaturgranthikā Vol. 3, 1996).

Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra:

S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, ed., Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra [on the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin] with the Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha [Tarkapāda]. (Madras: The University of Madras, Madras University Sanskrit Series 3.1, 1934).

Baudhāyanadharmasūtra [= BDhSū]. See Olivelle, Dharmasūtras, op. cit.

Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra:

S. Kuppuswami Sastri, ed., Brahmasiddhi by Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with Commentary by Śaṅkhapāṇi (Madras: Government Press, 1937).

Mānavadharmaśāstra [= Manu]. See Patrick Olivelle, Manu’s Code of Law. A critical Edition and Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha (= Āpadevī) of Āpadeva. See Franklin Edgerton, The Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevī: A treatise on the Mīmāṃsā system by Āpadeva (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986).

Mīmāṃsāsūtra, attributed to Jaimini:

Subbaśāstrī, Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Abhyaṃkara and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Ambādāsa Jośī, eds., śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte mīmāṃsādarśane (…). 7 vol. (Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvali 97.1–7, 1976–1984).

Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra [= VDhSū]. See Olivelle, Dharmasūtras, op. cit.

Vākyārthamātṛkā of Śālikanātha Miśra:

S = A. Subrahmanya Sastri, ed., Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra, with Nyāyasiddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa. (Benares: Banaras Hindu University, B.H.U. Darśana Series, 1961).

M = Mukunda Shâstri, ed., Prakaraṇapañcikā. A Treatise on Mīmāṃsā Philosophy by (…) Śālikanātha Miśra.(Benares: Vidya Vilasa Press, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, 1903/04).

Vidhiviveka [= ViV] of Maṇḍana Miśra:

S = Elliot M. Stern, Vidhivivekaḥ of Maṇḍana Miśraḥ, with commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśraḥ and supercommentaries Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī and Svaditaṅkaraṇī of Parameśvaraḥ. Critical and annotated edition: the pūrvapakṣaḥ [Sanskrit text] (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1988).

G = Mahāprabhu Lāl Goswamī, ed., Vidhivivekaḥ of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra, with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra (Benares: Tārā Printing Works, 1978).

Śābarabhāṣya [= Mīmāṃsābhāṣya] of Śabara(svāmin). See Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Erich Frauwallner, Materialen zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā (Wien: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1968).

Śābdanirṇaya of Prakāśātman:

See Hugo David, La parole comme moyen de connaissance. Recherches sur l’épistémologie de la connaissance verbale et la théorie de l’exégèse dans l’Advaita Vedānta (unpublished PhD thesis, École pratique des hautes études, Section des Sciences Religieuses, 2012).

GS = T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, ed., The Śābdanirṇaya by Prakāśātmayatīndra. (Trivandrum, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 53, 1917).

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:

Mānavallyupāhvatailaṅgarāmaśāstrī, ed., Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam śrīmatkumārilabhaṭṭapādaviracitam (…)śrīmatpārthasārathimiśrapraṇītayā nyāyaratnākarākhyayā vyākhyayānugatam. (Benares (Kāśī): Caukhambāsaṃskṛtagranthamālā 3, 1898).

See also Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (codanāsūtra). (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011).

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David, H. Theories of Human Action in Early Medieval Brahmanism (600–1000): Activity, Speech and Desire. J Value Inquiry 49, 567–595 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9528-3

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