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Notes
Judith Thomson, Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 30, n. 19; F. M. Kamm, “Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting,” Mind 111 (2002): 323–354; Simon Blackburn, “Am I Right?,” New York Times, February 21, 1999, sec. 1A.
Nicholas Southwood, Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 53.
Ibid., p. 53.
Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Stephen Darwall, “Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (2006): 193–214.
T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, p. 317; P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1–25.
For Scanlon’s discussion of the scope of morality see: Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 177–187.
Ibid., p. 153.
For more on servility see: Thomas E. Hill Jr., “Servility and Self-Respect,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 4–18.
Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other, p. 195. The weighing metaphor may be misleading. Reasons can relate to one another is a very rich way. For example, reasons can be defeated or undermined.
Ibid., p. 204.
Ibid., p. 195.
Judith Thomson, Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 188.
Scanlon generally holds that principles are claims about the acceptability of certain reasons for action rather than as maxims for action. See: Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 199–202.
Tamra Frei, “The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is not a Contractualist,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2009): 47–65; Michael Ridge, “Contractualism and the New and Improved Redundancy Objection,” Analysis 63 (2003), p. 337; Jussi Suikkanen, “Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objection,” Theoria 71 (2005), p. 40.
Philip Stratton-Lake, “Scanlon’s Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection,” Analysis 63 (2003), p. 71.
For a similar point see: Frei, op. cit., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 55.
Philip Pettit, “Review: Two Construals of Scanlon’s Contractualism,” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (March 2000), p. 162.
Philip Pettit, “Can Contract Theory Ground Morality,” in James Drier ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Malden, Mass., Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 93.
Philip Pettit, “A Consequentialist Perspective on Contractualism,” Theoria 66 (2000), p. 231.
Darwall makes a similar point in his discussion of slavery. See: Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint, p. 267.
Frei, op. cit., p. 59. This is why Frei claims that Scanlon is not a contractualist. In particular, for Scanlon’s replies see: T. M. Scanlon, “Replies,” Ratio 16 (2003), p. 128; T. M. Scanlon, “Reply to Gauthier and Gibbard,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003), p. 182.
Suikkanen, op. cit., p. 56.
Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other, p. 33.
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Paletta, D.R. The Structural Competence of Contractualism. J Value Inquiry 48, 437–447 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9440-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9440-2