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I am interested in this paper in intentional actions, and more generally, voluntary actions, including animal actions. In speaking of actions, I mean voluntary actions. Unintentional and involuntary actions are outside of the scope of this paper.
This view is defended by many philosophers, including Anscombe, Raz, Davidson and Williams. See Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (Harvard University Press, 1957); Donald Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Bernard Williams, B. “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 101–113. Joseph Raz, “On the Guise of the Good,” in Tenebaum, ed., Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (Oxford University Press US, 2010).
Although I mainly discuss Raz’s view, the objections made to his view will equally apply to any understanding of the guise of good which requires goodness to be the material conceptual object of a practical attitude.
See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
See Ulrike Heuer, “Guided by Reasons: Raz on the Normative-Explanatory Nexus,” Jurisprudence 2 (2011) pp. 353–365.
Raz later modifies his first premise. For simplicity, I keep the first premise in the original form. All my points apply equally to the modified premise.
Joseph Raz, “On the Guise of the Good,” in Tenebaum, ed., Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (Oxford University Press US, 2010), p. 111.
See Rosalind Hursthouse, “Arational Actions,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1991).
Ibid. p. 114.
Ibid. p. 129.
He says “I will not consider the conditions under which animals that do not possess concepts act intentionally, or have intentions, as I believe that those differ radically from the conditions under which animals possessing concepts act intentionally and have intentions.” Ibid. p. 135.
See Douglas Lavin, “Problems of Intellectualism: Raz on Reason and its Objects,” Jurisprudence 2 (2011) pp. 367–378. Gert in his review of an earlier work of Raz, brought up the charge of intellectualism. However, he does not discuss it in any detail. See Josua Gert, “Engaging Reason by Joseph Raz: Review,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 66, No. 3 (2003), pp. 745–748. From a Humean perspective, Frankfurt also criticizes Raz that he “assigns to reason a greater significance in our lives than it actually possess” Harry Frankfurt, “Disengaging Reason,” in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 119.
Douglas Lavin, “Problems of Intellectualism: Raz on Reason and its Objects,” Jurisprudence 2 (2011) p. 372.
Joseph Raz, “On the Guise of the Good,” in Tenebaum, ed., Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good (Oxford University Press US, 2010), p. 114.
Joseph Raz, “Reason, Reasons and Normativity,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed. (Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5, 2010). p. 7.
Joseph Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” in From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 30.
Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2001).
Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (Harvard University Press, 1957).
Joseph Raz, “Reason, Reasons and Normativity,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed. (Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 5, 2010).
Joseph Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” in Sandis, ed. New Essays on the Explanation of Action (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p. 195.
I am not going to argue for this interpretation, here. I argue for this view in a forthcoming paper. We should also note that (v) by itself does not entail this version of the guise of the good thesis. Somebody might accept (v) while holding that the formal object of an attitude is to fulfill a desire.
In the perceptual case, some have argued that perception essentially involves a kind of awareness of the normativity of our perceptual judgment; see, for example, Hannah Ginsborg, “Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity,” Inquiry, Vol. 45 (2006). However, Tyler Burge in his new book, Origins of Objectivity, convincingly argued that the views similar to Ginsborg’s can’t be correct.
David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” Nous (1992): 3–26. S Michael Stocker, Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” The Journal of Philosophy (1979): 738–753.
Thanks to John Hacker-Wright for formulating the objection and pressing me to clarify the issue.
Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford University Press, 200), p. 56.
See Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (Harvard University Press, 1957); Michael Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought (Harvard University Press, 2008); Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford University Press, 200), p. 56.
See Rosalind Hursthouse, “Arational Actions,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1991). David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” Nous (1992): 3–26. S. Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology,” The Journal of Philosophy (1979): 738–753.
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I am grateful to Matthew Hanser, Kevin Falvey, Stephen Engstrom, Michael Rescorla, Kieran Setiya, Mark Schroeder for helpful conversations or comments on previous versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the Editor of the journal, John Hacker-Wright, and anonymous reviewers of the journal for their helpful comments.
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Saemi, A. The Guise of the Good and the Problem of Over-Intellectualism. J Value Inquiry 48, 489–501 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9434-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9434-0