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Notes
See P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, ed. P.F. Strawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 71–96.
See George Sher, In Praise of Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
See R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 157.
See John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 28–39, 69, 81–82.
See, for example, G.A. Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 58 (May 2006), pp. 113–136; Angela Smith, “On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible,” Journal of Ethics, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007), pp. 465–484; T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2008); R. Jay Wallace, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 2010), pp. 307–341; and Macalester Bell, “The Standing to Blame: A Critique,” in D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 263–281.
See, for example, Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,”; Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 256–286; and Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
Darwall, op. cit., p. 67.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 68.
See Sher, op. cit., Chs. 5 and 6.
See Angela Smith, “On Being Responsible and Holding Resposible,” op. cit.
Darwall, op. cit., pp. 82–83.
Darwall, ibid., p. 5.
See Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 51–53.
Steve Matthews, “Authority, Hypocrisy, and Consistency,” unpublished manuscript, 2008.
See http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/standing, accessed 25 April 2013, p. 1.
These philosophers include Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, pp. 175–179; Angela Smith, op. cit., pp. 478–479; and R. Jay Wallace, “Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons,” passim.
Scanlon, ibid., p. 175.
Scanlon, ibid., pp. 175–176.
Scanlon, ibid., pp. 139–152.
Scanlon, ibid., pp. 176–177.
Wallace, “Hypocrisy,” pp. 317, 320–321.
Wallace, ibid., pp. 321–322.
Wallace, ibid., pp. 323–325.
Wallace, ibid., p. 326.
Wallace, ibid., pp. 326–327.
Wallace, ibid., pp. 328–329.
Bell, op. cit., p. 274.
Bell, ibid., pp. 274–275.
Bell, ibid., pp. 275–276.
Bell, ibid., pp. 275–276.
Bell, ibid., p. 276.
Wallace, op. cit., pp. 317–318.
Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto, Calif: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), pp. 214–218, 222–228. But see also Barbara Houston, “In Praise of Blame,” Hypatia, VII, 4 (Fall 1992), 128–147.
See Darwall, op. cit., p. 74.
Special thanks are owed to Catriona Mackenzie, Tony Coady, Daniel Cohen, Larry May, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Audiences at Australian National University, Macquarie University, Monash University, University of Melbourne, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Washington provided additional helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Friedman, M. How to Blame People Responsibly. J Value Inquiry 47, 271–284 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9377-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9377-x