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Notes
See Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91, no. 12, December, 1994; see also Sarah Buss, “Autonomy Reconsidered,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 19, 1994; Sigurdur Kristinsson, “The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of Autonomy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy vol. 30, no. 2, June, 2000; Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured,” in Relational Autonomy, eds. Mackenzie and Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006); Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” in Relational Autonomy, eds. Mackenzie and Stoljar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
See John Christman, The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009); see also Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Laura Ekstrom, “A Coherence Theory of Autonomy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 53, 1993; and Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
See Thomas Hill, “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John Christman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947).
Friedman, op. cit., p. 19.
Mackenzie and Stoljar, op. cit., p. 19.
See Trudy Govier, “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem,” Hypatia, vol. 8, 1993; and Robin Dillon, “Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect,” Hypatia, vol. 7 1992.
See Stoljar, op. cit.
See Susan Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. F. D. Schoeman (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 17, no. 3, 1991.
See Mackenzie and Stoljar, op. cit., pp. 19–21.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104b5, ed. and trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), p. 20.
See Frankfurt, op. cit.; see also Dworkin, op. cit.
Friedman, op. cit., p. 8.
Ibid., p. 13.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid., p. 25.
Christman, op. cit., p. 155.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 145.
Ibid., p. 147.
See Meyers, Self, Society and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), prt. II, sec. 4.
Friedman, op. cit., p. 4.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Editor-in-Chief Thomas Magnell of the Journal of Value Inquiry, and James Rocha for their detailed and helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Matthew Piper for his continuing guidance and unflagging support for my philosophical endeavors.
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Piper, M. Autonomous Agency and Normative Implication. J Value Inquiry 46, 317–330 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9344-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9344-y