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Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics

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Notes

  1. See John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

  2. Ibid., pp. 154, 155 and 159.

  3. Ibid., pp. 132–133.

  4. Ibid., p. 132.

  5. Ibid., p. 157.

  6. Ibid., p. 162; see also ibid., pp. 132–133.

  7. See Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004 ); see also Michael Huemer Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), and Elizabeth Tropman, “Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 33 (2008).

  8. See McDowell, op. cit., p. 134.

  9. Ibid., p. 136.

  10. See ibid., pp. 134, 136 and 146.

  11. Ibid., p. 136.

  12. Ibid., p. 139.

  13. See ibid., pp. 199–200.

  14. See ibid., pp. 201–216.

  15. Ibid., p. 143.

  16. See ibid.

  17. See Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), ch. 9; see also Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 1 (1992) , pp. 152–165.

  18. McDowell, op. cit., pp. 133 and 139.

  19. Ibid., p. 139.

  20. Ibid., p. 134.

  21. See ibid., pp. 157–162.

  22. See ibid., p. 157.

  23. Ibid., p. 160.

  24. Ibid., p. 159.

  25. Ibid., p. 146.

  26. See Margaret Olivia Little, “Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology,” Hypatia, Vol. 10 (1995).

  27. Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, op. cit., p. 156.

  28. See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 2; see also Audi, op. cit., and Huemer, op. cit.

  29. See Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism,” in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 189 and 216, n. 42.

  30. See McDowell, op. cit., p. 200.

  31. See ibid., pp. 77–94 and 198–218.

  32. Ibid., pp. 89 and 87–88.

  33. Ibid., p. 147.

  34. See ibid., pp. 50–73 and 148–149.

  35. Ibid., p. 73.

  36. See D’Arms and Jacobson, op. cit.

  37. I would like to thank Robert Audi, D. Charles McCarty, Christopher Pariso, an anonymous referee from this journal, and Thomas Magnell, Editor-in-Chief of The Journal of Value Inquiry, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Parts of this article were presented at the 2009 American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, and I also wish to thank the members of that audience for a useful discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 80523-1781, USA

    Elizabeth Tropman

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Tropman, E. Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics. J Value Inquiry 44, 31–45 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9

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