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Determinants of successful delivery by non-state actors: an exploratory study

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Abstract

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are giving an increasingly prominent role to non-state actor action. Reflecting this development, significant research efforts have gone into studying non-state actor actions. However, the literature shows a paucity of studies of the determinants of delivery by non-state actors. The article asks the following question: what is the full range of determinants of delivery by non-state actor focused on adaptation to climate change and disaster risk reduction? Drawing on data collected through interviews with, and a survey of, core partners in a selection of non-state actor actions, the article puts forward a taxonomy that can help gauge the likelihood that a non-state actor action may be able to deliver on its intended objectives. The findings presented in the article reveal that several of the determinants of delivery by non-state actors are outside of the sphere of influence of the core partners in these actions. The article makes the case for using this kind of taxonomies to conducting ex ante assessments of non-state actor actions, with a view to reflecting the results of the assessments in the design of the action, thus increasing the quality of non-state actor action.

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Notes

  1. Transnational governance can be defined by opposition to what might be called “intergovernmental governance”, which refers to the set of rules that govern the collective efforts of at least two state actors pursuing a shared, public goal (Roger and Dauvergne 2016). Thus, “intergovernmental governance” would be restricted to national-level governments and would exclude explicitly non-state actors.

  2. In decision 1/CP.21, through which the Paris Agreement is implemented, paragraph 117 «welcomes the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions», whilst paragraph 118 «encourages Parties to work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to strengthen mitigation […] action» (UNFCCC 2015). Paragraph 134 in the same decision «invites […] non-Party stakeholders […] to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions» (ibid).

  3. Most non-state actor actions focus on climate change mitigation mainly because, compared to adaptation to climate change and to disaster risk reduction, mitigation action has a much longer history.

  4. Although some of these studies explore both direct and indirect impacts, most focus on direct impacts.

  5. It is worth noting that indirect impacts can be both positive and negative (van der Ven et al. 2017).

  6. Studies of non-state actor actions that focus exclusively on adaptation to climate change are scarce, partly because practice is still limited. Dzebo and Stripple (2015) authored the first such studies, to which a second one was added recently (Dzebo 2019). Most other studies of adaptation-focused non-state actor actions also cover their mitigation-focused counterparts. A review by Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2017) provides an example of this.

  7. Human development-oriented non-state actor actions potentially overlap with adaptation-focused actions. The study excludes the former and includes only those that bill themselves as focused on adaptation (or disaster risk reduction).

  8. To identify this initial set of actions, we relied on the Climate Initiatives Platform (CIP 2019), which makes it possible to select initiatives based on focus area.

  9. Specifically, the interviews allowed us to judge whether the core partners in each of the actions studied had an empirically based understanding of the determinants of delivery, acquired through the experience gained implementing the action.

  10. It is worth noting that there is no link between the approach to selecting non-state actor actions and the approach to designing the survey form. Stated differently, the number of actions selected, and the process to select them, is independent from the information collected through the survey.

  11. Further to an initial contact by e-mail, survey respondents were briefed on the phone about the scope and goal of the survey. They submitted their responses by e-mail. A second phone conversation was used to ensure that the responses provided were fully aligned with the type of response sought. This helped increase, across respondents, the comparability of the responses received.

  12. Five of the six non-state actor actions studied report on their activities (Table 2). Evidence of delivery by these non-state actor actions is included in these reports, which are scrutinised by third parties. As for the remaining action, we conducted additional interviews (with sub-national government agency staff involved in the action), to understand whether the action delivered on its objectives.

  13. That a non-state actor action delivers on its stated objectives says nothing about the level of ambition of those objectives, or about the efficiency with which delivery occurred.

  14. As stated by one of our interviewees.

  15. In the context of the visibility sought by potential private-sector funders, it is interesting to note that Forecast-based Financing and Rural Resilience Initiative, which have a narrow focus, have raised larger amounts of private-sector funds, compared to Crisis Anticipation Window, which has a broader focus. As indicated by our interviewees, the broader the focus, the more reduced the visibility and thus the more difficult it becomes to mobilise private-sector funding.

  16. This non-state actor action targets least-developed countries, where the poorest can seldom expect assistance from domestic governmental agencies.

  17. The closer the dialogue, the more effective the non-state actor action is likely to be and, in the mid- to long-term, the higher the chances that state actors choose to adopt a successful non-state actor approach.

  18. Several core partners in Forecast-based Financing and one core partner in Crisis Anticipation Window assessed Rural Resilience Initiative as performing at the highest level in the areas of risk reduction and risk transfer.

  19. For example, an underdeveloped regulatory framework may spur disaster risk reduction activities by non-state actor actions. Yet, the same sub-optimal regulatory framework can also hinder these activities when, for example, credit market regulations are inefficient or absent. Not least, it is the same underdeveloped regulatory framework that will hamper the uptake of those activities by state actors.

  20. It is worth noting that “equal distribution of power” unduly rules out other legitimate types of interactions.

  21. Examples of functions include “knowledge production”, “norm and standard setting” or “policy planning”, among others. Examples of outputs include “publications”, “funding” or “events”, among others. Chan et al. (2015) provide a listing of functions and outputs (see Table 1 and Table 2, respectively, in Annex 1).

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Puig, D., Bakhtiari, F. Determinants of successful delivery by non-state actors: an exploratory study. Int Environ Agreements 21, 93–111 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09482-8

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