Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

The global stocktake: design lessons for a new review and ambition mechanism in the international climate regime

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The pledge-and-review architecture of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change has been praised as a new model of global environmental governance. Instead of internationally agreed-upon emission reduction targets, the agreement relies on countries’ repeated, voluntary pledges and actions. A key mechanism for monitoring progress toward shared global goals, putting pressure on countries to live up to their promises, and increasing ambition over time is the global stocktake. The stocktake’s twin-purposes to act simultaneously as a review and ambition mechanism render it a global governance innovation. Absent a clear institutional precedent, the global stocktake presents a design challenge for the climate negotiation community. This paper develops a number of lessons for designing the stocktaking process based on a review of relevant scholarship and an analysis of the 2013–2015 Periodic Review as a limited precedent within the climate regime. While we cannot predict what will make the stocktake successful, these design principles could increase the chances for its effectiveness. These lessons offer potential guidance for decision-makers with implications for the future effectiveness of the Paris Agreement.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Other review processes that are part of the climate regime, (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Mechanism or components of the Measurement, Reporting and Verification system), but are less likely to serve as precedent because (1) they assess the performance of individual Parties, and (2) they do not have the purpose of raising ambition. In the PA, individualized review is the subject of Article 13 (Enhanced Transparency Framework) rather than Article 14 (GST).

  2. Additional supporting quotes from interviews and primary documents are contained in “Appendix B” (Electronic Supplementary Material).

References

  • Andresen, S., & Hey, E. (2005). The effectiveness and legitimacy of international environmental institutions. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 5(3), 211–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S., & Stavins, R. (2003). Increasing participation and compliance in international climate change agreements. International Environmental Agreements, 3(4), 349–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biermann, F., & Gupta, A. (2011). Accountability and legitimacy in earth system governance: A research framework. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 1856–1864.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D. (2010). The art and craft of international environmental law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D. (2015). Legal options for U.S. acceptance of a new climate change agreement (SSRN scholarly paper no. ID 2652008). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2652008. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.

  • Canada, New Zealand, Norway, & USA. (2014). 2013–2015 Review submission on behalf of Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and the United States of America. Views on the future work of the SED, including the further use of different sources of information.

  • Cecys, K. (2010). MRV: A survey of reporting and review in multilateral regimes. Arlington: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.

    Google Scholar 

  • Checkel, J. T. (1998). The constructivist turn in international relations theory. World Politics, 50(2), 324–348.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • China. (2017). Preliminary material in preparation for the first iteration of the informal note on this agenda item. Revised building blocks for APA item 6 (GST).

  • Craft, B., & Fisher, S. (2018). Measuring the adaptation goal in the global stocktake of the Paris Agreement. Climate Policy, 18(9), 1203–1209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Depledge, J. (2006). The opposite of learning: Ossification in the climate change regime. Global Environmental Politics, 6(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2006.6.1.1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falkner, R. (2016). The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international climate politics. International Affairs, 92(5), 1107–1125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friman, H. (Ed.). (2015). The politics of leverage in international relations: Name, shame, and sanction (2015th ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haas, P. M., Keohane, R. O., & Levy, M. A. (1993). Institutions for the earth: Sources of effective international environmental protection. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Handl, G. (1997). Compliance control mechanisms and international environmental obligations. Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 5, 29–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermwille, L., & Siemons, A. (2018). What makes an ideal global stocktake? A functional analysis. German Enviroment Agency (Bundesumweltamt). Retrieved from https://epub.wupperinst.org/frontdoor/index/index/docId/7141. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.

  • Hisschemöller, M., & Gupta, J. (1999). Problem-solving through international environmental agreements: The issue of regime effectiveness. International Political Science Review, 20(2), 151–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huang, J. (2018). What can the Paris Agreement’s global stocktake learn from the sustainable development goals? Carbon & Climate Law Review, 12(3), 218–228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klinsky, S., Roberts, T., Huq, S., Okereke, C., Newell, P., Dauvergne, P., et al. (2017). Why equity is fundamental in climate change policy research. Global Environmental Change, 44(Supplement C), 170–173.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krain, M. (2012). J’accuse! Does naming and shaming perpetrators reduce the severity of genocides or politicides? International Studies Quarterly, 56(3), 574–589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kramarz, T., & Park, S. (2016). Accountability in global environmental governance: A meaningful tool for action? Global Environmental Politics, 16(2), 1–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krasner, S. D. (1983). International regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laird, S. (1999). The WTO’s trade policy review mechanism—From through the looking glass. World Economy, 22(6), 741–764.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leemans, R., & Vellinga, P. (2017). The scientific motivation of the internationally agreed ‘well below 2 °C’ climate protection target: A historical perspective. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 26(Supplement C), 134–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mason, M. (2008). The governance of transnational environmental harm: Addressing new modes of accountability/responsibility. Global Environmental Politics, 8(3), 8–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMahon, E., & Ascherio, M. (2012). A step ahead in promoting human rights? The universal periodic review of the UN Human Rights Council. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 18(2), 231–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mercer, J. (2014). Feeling like a state: Social emotion and identity. International Theory, 6(03), 515–535. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971914000244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, & United States. (2013). 2013–2015 Review. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/new_zealand_sbsta_38_review_16.5.13.pdf. Accessed 14 Aug 2018.

  • Northrop, E., Dagnet, Y., Höhne, N., Thwaites, J., & Mogelgaard, K. (2018). Achieving the ambition of Paris: Designing the global stocktake. World Resources Institute (WRI). Retrieved from https://www.wri.org/publication/pact-global-stocktake-design. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.

  • Rajamani, L. (2016). Ambition and differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: interpretive possibilities and underlying politics. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 65(2), 493–514.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rogelj, J., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., et al. (2016). Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C. Nature, 534(7609), 631–639.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Schleussner, C.-F., Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Lissner, T., Licker, R., Fischer, E. M., et al. (2016). Science and policy characteristics of the Paris Agreement temperature goal. Nature Climate Change, 6(9), 827–835.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stua, M. (2017). From the Paris Agreement to a low-carbon bretton woods: Rationale for the establishment of a mitigation alliance. Berlin: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sturgis, P., & Allum, N. (2004). Science in society: Re-evaluating the deficit model of public attitudes. Public Understanding of Science, 13(1), 55–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tompkins, E. L., Vincent, K., Nicholls, R. J., & Suckall, N. (2018). Documenting the state of adaptation for the global stocktake of the Paris Agreement. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 9(5), e545.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNEP. (2012). Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer 2012: A success in the making. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

    Google Scholar 

  • UNEP. (2017). The emissions gap report 2017. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Program (UNEP).

    Google Scholar 

  • UNFCCC. (2018). Draft elements for APA agenda item 6. Matters relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. Informal note by the co-facilitators—Final iteration. Version of 8 May 2018.

  • UNFCCC. (n.d.). Periodic review—Science. Retrieved September 15, 2017, from http://unfccc.int/science/workstreams/the_2013-2015_review/items/6998.php.

  • van Asselt, H. (2016). The role of non-state actors in reviewing ambition, implementation, and compliance under the paris agreement. Climate Law, 6(1–2), 91–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Asselt, H., Sælen, H., & Pauw, P. (2015). Assessment and review under a 2015 climate change agreement. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vandyck, T., Keramidas, K., Saveyn, B., Kitous, A., & Vrontisi, Z. (2016). A global stocktake of the Paris pledges: Implications for energy systems and economy. Global Environmental Change, 41, 46–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. The American Political Science Review, 88(2), 384–396.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. R. (1994). International governance: Protecting the environment in a stateless society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. R. (2001). Inferences and indices: Evaluating the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. Global Environmental Politics, 1(1), 99–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, O. R. (2011). Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(50), 19853–19860.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, O., & Levy, M. (1999). The effectiveness of international environmental regimes. In O. Young (Ed.), The effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Causal connections and behavioral mechanisms. (pp. 1–32). The MIT Press.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Research for this article was supported by the College of Liberal Arts at Purdue University with an Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences Grant (#209646) in 2017.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Purdue University, 100 N University Street, West Lafayette, IN, 47907, USA

    Manjana Milkoreit & Kate Haapala

Authors
  1. Manjana Milkoreit
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Kate Haapala
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Manjana Milkoreit.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Electronic supplementary material

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 28 kb)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Milkoreit, M., Haapala, K. The global stocktake: design lessons for a new review and ambition mechanism in the international climate regime. Int Environ Agreements 19, 89–106 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9425-x

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9425-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation