Abstract
It is generally considered difficult to resolve negative unidirectional externalities within hydro-hegemonic basins in which the upstream powerful riparian has the incentive to unilaterally develop the river without regard to downstream consequences. Weaker downstream riparian states can resort to issue linkages and side payments to coerce a change in the upstream hydro-hegemon’s behavior, but the success of these tools depends on the specific political and economic situation in the basin and on the preferences of the hydro-hegemonic state for cooperation. Neglected in the literature is another possibility. Through a consideration of the sanctioned discourse of watershed management at the domestic levels, this article shows that domestic environmental non-governmental organizations and policy entrepreneurs—through the application of a range of tools—can work to change the domestic water management discourse from a state-hydraulic paradigm to a more sustainable water management paradigm. When these efforts are successful, we can find that these non-state actors can perform a crucial function in cleaning up domestic stretches of international rivers, which produces positive externalities downstream. In the process, they are able of achieving what often years of international negotiations failed to accomplish. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, India’s policies on water quality in the national stretches of Ganges Basin and China’s policies on biodiversity in the national stretches of the Mekong Basin are used to make this argument.
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Notes
Environmental DNGOs are “non-profit groups whose primary mission is to reverse environmental degradation or promote sustainable forms of development” (Princen et al. 1994, p. 16).
Policy entrepreneurs are “political actors who promote policy ideas” (Mintrom 1997, p. 739), including the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge (Huitema and Meijerink 2009, p. 224). Kingdon (1995) argues that policy entrepreneurs can be located anywhere, whether it is in civil society or government, including politicians, civil servants, researchers, and lobbyists. They can assume advocacy, advisory, or intermediary functions, and they “need opportunities in the form of problem and political windows to get their new policy ideas and plans accepted and realized” (Huitema and Meijerink 2009, p. 224, 390).
For more information on positive and negative unidirectional externality problems (see Dombrowsky 2009).
While hydro-hegemons can elect to use either hard or soft power to secure their interests in using the international river (Zeitoun et al. 2011), non-state actors, such as DNGOs or policy entrepreneurs only have the options to use soft power.
Transnational advocacy networks also enable DNGOs to draw on international actors to help put pressure on national governments (Risse-Kappen 1995), particularly through the boomerang model (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This strategy however was not used by the non-state actors in the cases analyzed in this article.
Since India gained its independence from Britain, it signed several treaties with Nepal. These include: Kosi Treaty of 1954 and its amendment in 1966; the Gandak Treaty of 1959 and its amendment in 1964; Tanakpur Treaty of 1991; and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996.
From 1948 until 1971, Pakistan consisted of two wings—western and eastern. In 1971, eastern Pakistan became Bangladesh.
Although the initial objective of GAP was to prevent the river’s pollution, it changed to achieving water quality at bathing class standard that allows some pollution to reach the river (World Bank 2011).
As it enters Bangladesh, the water has high concentrations of TDS, chlorides, and sulfates among several other chemicals (Asafuddowlah 1995). This pollution has harmed the agricultural and industrial sectors, ruining the livelihood of farmers and industrialists in Bangladesh (Swain 1996; Nishat 1996). Lack of access to clean water has meant that waterborne diseases are the major cause of mortality and morbidity among people residing near Padma (Ahmed et al. 1998).
Jaiswal suggested that the practice of placing cremated bodies into the Ganga is not tied to the Hindu religion but associated with superstition (Interview with Jaiswal 2011).
In 2000, President Clinton invited Professor Mishra to share the platform with him in an event celebrating World Water Day (Interview with Mishra 2011).
Although Phase I was targeted to end in 1990, it was extended to March 2000 (Ganga Action Plan, 2003–2004).
In 1975, North Vietnam took over South Vietnam to create a unified country under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
Apart from the Mekong, the other rivers in Yunnan province with hydropower stations in construction or planning phases are the Nu/Salween and Jinsha rivers.
The other areas in China are the prefectures Diqing, Nujiang, Dali, Baoshan, and Lincang, plus Simao district under the Pu’er prefecture.
Note on Hensengerth’s interviews in China: given the politically sensitive nature of the issue, all interviews are encoded. The letter abbreviates the location, the numbers show the date.
On ethnic minorities and biodiversity see, for example, Wang and Gu (2009).
It is also located in Deqin county of Diqing prefecture in the northern part of the Mekong Headwaters Biodiversity Corridor. Deqin county is part of the UNESCO World Heritage of the Three Parallel Rivers Nu, Lancang, and Jinsha.
This marketing mechanism includes an application for certification according to the Food Quality Safety Market Access System (QS System) that is implemented by the central government’s General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine: Interview K05012009.
Construction started in 2006, operation is expected in 2017.
For similar examples of Lancang dams see China Daily (2002).
Abbreviations
- CBIK:
-
Center for Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge
- CPCB:
-
Central Pollution Control Board
- DNGOs:
-
Domestic Non-governmental Organizations
- GAP:
-
Ganga Action Plan
- MRC:
-
Mekong River Commission
- SCC:
-
Supreme Court Case
- SCR:
-
Supreme Court Ruling
- SPCBs:
-
State Pollution Control Boards
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We wish to thank Mark Giordano, Kelly Alley, Sarah Matthews, Jeroen Warner, Diana Suhardiman, the reviewers of this article, and the editors for their feedback.
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Zawahri, N.A., Hensengerth, O. Domestic environmental activists and the governance of the Ganges and Mekong Rivers in India and China. Int Environ Agreements 12, 269–298 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9179-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-012-9179-9
Keywords
- International rivers
- Domestic non-governmental environmental movements
- Ganges River
- Mekong River