Abstract
Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.
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Notes
Wallner (2002) as well as Aggarwal and Dupont (2002) use a 3 × 3 matrix setting in order to discuss the underlying conditions under which institutions might promote cooperation among states. Selten et al. (2003) elicit subjects’ strategies for playing any 2-person 3 × 3 game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99.
The game theoretical terminology tends to undermine the seriousness of the problems being posed. The chicken game is a shorthand description of the payoff situation, but we acknowledge that it is just a conventional shorthand for a much more serious matter.
Of course, in the literature, the analysis of international environmental agreements is not restricted to discrete PD or chicken games. For analyses considering continuous strategy spaces see, for instance, Golombek and Hoel (2005) or Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. (2010). Furthermore, papers can be found in which the number of countries that potentially contribute to a public good exceeds two, see e.g. Buchholz et al. (2006) in which also the role of income levels is explicitly considered.
“Greenhouse gas emissions have a global impact no matter where they are emitted because the atmospheric lifetimes of the greenhouse gases are typically long enough that they are subject to full atmospheric dispersal” (DeCanio 2005: 420).
“[I]nternational treaties have to rely on voluntary participation and must be designed in a self-enforcing way” (Eyckmans and Finus 2007: 74).
The all-side neutral case just reflects the state in which the PD game turns into a chicken game and in the real world this state has probably been transgressed already in the past. Yet, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we could return to this state in future. Hence, alternatively—in order to translate the setting into current real-world circumstances—we could denote the three strategies strongly mitigate, modestly mitigate, follow current patterns instead of mitigate, neutral, increase.
It seems that Rotillon and Tazdaϊt (1996) derive their assumption that the PD game becomes a coordination game (chicken game) just from the fact that countries start to negotiate/coordinate. Although their conclusions, drawn from their observation that countries engage in international negotiations, are certainly right, the reason why countries change their behaviour remains obscure in their analysis.
For a discussion of the common practice of eliminating dominated strategies from a normal-form game, see Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
The ancillary effect of sulfur emission reductions (e.g. by means of reducing the fossil fuel consumption) is positive from an air pollution point of view (i.e. it helps to preserve human health), but from a climate protection point of view it might be counterproductive. As Schelling (2007: 3) points out: “It is estimated that sulfur currently in the atmosphere […] may be masking a significant part of the expected greenhouse effect”, i.e. sulfur may help to cool the earth.
“Any action combating global warming will be, intended or not, a foreign aid program” (Schelling 1997: 8).
The ancillary costs of climate protection are of course different to the ancillary costs of the reduction of climate protection. On ancillary cost of climate protection see e.g. Krupnick et al. (2000: 71–73).
First hints that CFCs may harm the ozone layer came up a long time before the Montreal Protocol was opened for signature in 1987. Molina and Rowland (1974) already stressed that the emission of CFCs could destroy the stratospheric ozone layer.
As Nash (1953: 129) stresses: “Of course, one cannot represent all possible bargaining devices as moves in the non-cooperative game. The negotiation process must be formalized and restricted, but in such a way that each participant is still able to utilize all the essential strengths of his position”.
They focus their investigation on the international efforts to curb the emissions of ozone-depleting substances.
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Pittel, K., Rübbelke, D.T.G. Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond. Int Environ Agreements 12, 23–39 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9126-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-010-9126-6