Assessing the effectiveness of health care cost containment measures: evidence from the market for rehabilitation care

  • Nicolas R. Ziebarth


This study empirically evaluates the effectiveness of different health care cost containment measures. The measures investigated were introduced in Germany in 1997 to reduce moral hazard and public health expenditures in the market for rehabilitation care. Of the analyzed measures, doubling the daily copayments was clearly the most effective cost containment measure, resulting in a reduction in utilization of about \(20\,\%\) . Indirect measures such as allowing employers to cut federally mandated sick pay or paid vacation during inpatient post-acute care stays did not significantly reduce utilization. There is evidence neither for adverse health effects nor for substitution effects in terms of more doctor visits.


Health care demand Cost-sharing Health effects Preventive care Substitution effects SOEP 

JEL Classification

G22 H51 I11 I12 I18 J14 J22 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Policy Analysis and Management (PAM)Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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