Abstract
To avoid risk selection, the market for complementary health insurance is usually completely separate from the market for basic health insurance. In Switzerland, however, the basic benefit package and complementary insurance are offered by the same insurer. Risk-based premiums are allowed with respect to complementary insurance. This paper compares the Swiss integration approach to the separation approach. It is shown that under the integration approach insurers cream-skim by selling complementary insurance to low risks at a discount. Nevertheless, the integration approach can be Pareto-superior if the cost savings due to the integration of basic and complementary insurance are sufficiently large.
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JEL Classification H51 · I18
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Kifmann, M. Risk selection and complementary health insurance: The Swiss approach. Int J Health Care Finance Econ 6, 151–170 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-006-8162-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-006-8162-9