Abstract
In this essay, I discuss the relationship between Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology and subsequent developments in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (CA). I argue that a point of continuity in ethnomethodology and CA, which marks both as radically different from long-standing traditions in Western philosophy and social science, is the claim that social order is evidently produced in ongoing activities, and that no specialized theory or methodology is necessary for making such order observable and accountable. In the half-century following the publication of Studies, Garfinkel explicitly aimed to radicalize ethnomethodology’s stance toward what he called “formal” or “classical” treatments of social order, while much of CA pursued the path of an empirical social science that became increasingly integrated with other branches of social science. Nevertheless, I argue, Garfinkel’s radical initiatives are not completely out of play in ethnomethodological conversational analysis, and the potential remains for further elucidating, exemplifying, and developing them.
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Notes
“Normal science” is a term that Kuhn (1962) used to describe the periods of relative stability in natural science fields in the aftermath of the establishment of novel “paradigms”. Unlike the more fractious “revolutionary” periods when an ascendant paradigm (e.g., relativity and quantum theory in early twentieth century physics) displaces an entrenched “classical” paradigm, normal science is characterized by general consensus among recognized members of the field. Members then marginalize “mavericks,” amass an accumulation of findings, and pursue puzzle solutions embedded within established theories and techniques. As Wieder (1993: 210) points out, Kuhn excluded the social sciences from his scheme, but it became common in sociology textbooks to speak of multiple paradigms that co-exist uneasily in the field for extended periods of time. Although they did not invoke Kuhn explicitly, proponents of CA both prospectively and retrospectively characterized their field as progressive, technical and consensual, with an established methodology, a growing corpus of data and findings, a well-established literature, and a recognized hierarchy of leading practitioners. Collins (1994: 172) suggested two decades ago that, unlike many other research programs in sociology, CA was developing along the path of a “high-consensus, rapid discovery science,” in which technologically-mediated research had produced a developing series of findings about new phenomena, though he observed that the accumulation had thus-far been less than rapid.
For discussions on the “respecification” of central topics in the human sciences, see Button (1991).
The passage was compiled and edited by Gail Jefferson, drawing from Sacks’s transcribed lectures and writings from approximately two decades earlier.
Heritage (2016) draws upon Wilson’s scheme in a draft paper that was posted online (on academia.edu) in October 1016, as a “rebuttal” to a special issue of Discourse Studies guest edited by Lynch and Macbeth (2016). The references to Wilson and discussion of his argument were deleted from the published version (Heritage 2018), and the earlier draft is no longer available online. Arminen (2008) also presents a similar contrast between “radical” ethnomethodology, exemplified by Garfinkel and his students’ studies of work in recent decades, and the current development of “scientific” CA. A different contrast was presented by Pollner (1991, 2012), but unlike Wilson and Arminen, he treated both CA and Garfinkel’s more recent work as a de-radicalization of earlier ethnomethodology—specifically, a downplaying of “radical reflexivity”. For a different view of ethnomethodology’s stance on reflexivity see Lynch (2000).
The passage from Garfinkel et al. (1988) quoted earlier on the “agreement between the Athenians and the Mancunians” expresses a similar point about the ancient and persistent “obsession” to reconstruct everyday speech and action into technical material for analysis.
This is related to what Garfinkel et al. (1981: 157) discuss in their study of a discovery of a novel astrophysical phenomenon (an optical pulsar): the participants’ use of the pronoun “it” in a way that suspends reference to, e.g., a pattern on a screen, an artifact, or an astronomical source, until a later time when the astrophysical and equipmental sense of “it” may be made more definite.
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Acknowledgements
A version of this paper was delivered at the 2017 meeting of the International Institute for Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (IIEMCA) at Otterbein College, Westerville, OH, 10–13 July 2017. I am grateful for comments and criticisms from Doug Macbeth, Jean Wong, and many others who attended the meeting. I am also heavily indebted to Anne Rawls and Jason Turowetz for suggestions and assistance in locating documentary materials from the Garfinkel archive.
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Lynch, M. Garfinkel, Sacks and Formal Structures: Collaborative Origins, Divergences and the History of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. Hum Stud 42, 183–198 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-019-09510-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-019-09510-w