Abstract
There are many ways of interpreting the behaviours related to substance misuse and addiction, which can be sort out as three basic models: biomedical, legal, and social. They are corresponding to approaches built in different epistemic and professional frameworks, such as medicine, law, and social work. Confronted with the experience of addiction, these models appear as pre-determined by a specific scientific or professional ideology; they presuppose a pre-understanding of the phenomena. I directed, therefore, my investigation on those phenomenological paths that might lead to, and circumscribe the experience of addiction and I propose an analytical framework based on three major phenomenological perspectives: descriptive, genetic, and inter-relational. This paper argues in favour of defining addiction without making reference to a form of failure, psycho-somatic or existential. On the contrary, it concludes that there is a need to adopt a definition of addiction which holds at its core the idea of empowering addicted persons, of re-constructing their capacity to take decisions about their own lives.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
As a recent survey shows, “[t]he major features of the European drug landscape has remained relatively stable in recent years. Drug use remains high by historical standards, but positive changes can be seen, with record levels of treatment provision accompanied by some signs of erosion in injecting, new heroin use, cocaine consumption and cannabis smoking. Any optimism, however, must be tempered by concerns that youth unemployment and service cuts could lead to the re-emergence of ‘old’ problems. Moreover, a closer examination suggests that the drug situation may now be in a state of flux, with ‘new’ problems emerging that challenge current policy and practice models: new synthetic drugs and patterns of use are appearing, both on the illicit drug market and in the context of non-controlled substances” (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 2013: 11). In USA, “[i]n 2011, an estimated 22.5 million Americans aged 12 or older were current (past month) illicit drug users, representing 8.7 % of the population; in 2002, by contrast, there were 19.5 million current users, or 8.3 % of the population” (The 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health 2012).
For a critical outline of the ways in which addiction is constructed in the contemporary biomedical discourse of the practitioners involved in the treatment and recovery of addicted people, see Copoeru and Moldovan (2013).
Conrad and Barker (2010) are outlining the policy implications of the constructionist findings in medical sociology.
Sean Leneghan shows that the central task of Strassser was to describe “how a world arises in a dialogue between me and the other” (Strasser 1969: 22), who, of course, through “the dialogue as an active-receptive interplay” (Strasser 1969: 65) is approached as a “you”. It is important to point out that for Strasser the mutual “attunement” constitutive of the dialogal situation is not just the commonly privileged “harmonious” mode but includes also negative modalities for “without tensions, differences of opinion, divergences of practical and theoretical approaches, the dialogue would soon come to a standstill. A ‘you’ that cannot contradict the other cannot really speak with him (sic)” (1969: 65). In this perspective the dialogal phenomenology facilitates the practice of critical ethnographic reflection and suspension in the context of real rather than idealised interpersonal engagements.
The Schutzean concept of “ordinary people” (1970) refers both to those who accept and use some concepts and theories related to an issue, such as addiction, and to those who are virtually submitted to the practices derived from this (pre)theoretical foreground.
For example, doctors believe that 71 % of patients with breast cancer rate keeping their breasts as a top priority, but the actual figure reported by patients, is just 7 %.
References
Binswanger, L. (1956). Drei Formen missglückten Daseins: Verstiegenheit, Verschrobenheit, Manieriertheit. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Carr, D. (1987). Interpreting Husserl. Critical and comparative studies. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff.
Conrad, P., & Barker, K. (2010). The social construction of illness. Key insights and policy implications. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51, 67–79.
Copoeru, I., & Moldovan, S. (2013). The virtues and limits of the biomedical model for interpreting the behaviours related to substance misuse and addiction. Studia UBB. Philosophia, 59(Suppl 1), 71–78.
Downes, D., & Rock, P. E. (2007). Understanding deviance: A guide to the sociology of crime and rule-breaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Duyndam, J. (2009). Sincerely me. Enjoyment and the truth of hedonism. In B. Hofmeyr (Ed.), Radical passivity. Rethinking ethical agency in Levinas. Dordrecht: Springer.
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. (2013). European drug report: Trends and development. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Farrugia, D. (2009). Exploring stigma: Medical knowledge and the stigmatisation of parents of children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Sociology of Health & Illness, 31(7), 1011–1027.
Gurwitsch, A. (2010). Gelb–Goldstein’s concept of “concrete” and “categorial” attitude and the phenomenology of ideation. The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). Phaenomenologica, 193, 403–431.
Heidegger, M. (1977). Sein und Zeit. In: F. W. von Herrmann (Ed.), Gesamtuasgabe, Band 2. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Helinski, S., & Spanagel, R. (2001). Publication trends in addiction research. Addiction Biology, 16(4), 532–539.
Henry, J., & Rella, J. (2001). Medical risks associated with MDMA use. In J. Holland (Ed.), Ecstasy: The complete guide. Vermont: Park Street Press.
Husserl, E. (1939). Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, L. Landgrebe (Hg.). Prag: Academia/Verlagsbuchhandlungs.
Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, M. Biemel (Hg.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff (Hua IV).
Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926, M. Fleischer (Hg.). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1968). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925, W. Biemel (Hg.). The Hague, Netherlands: MartinusNijhoff (Hua IX).
Husserl, E. (1988). Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914, U. Melle (Hg.). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic.
Kemp, R. (2009). The temporal dimension of addiction. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 40(1), 1–18.
Kirmayer, L., & Young, A. (1998). Culture and somatization: Clinical, epidemiological, and ethnographic perspectives. Psychosomatic Medicine, 60, 420–430.
Leneghan, S. (2011). The varieties of ecstasy experience: An exploration of person, mind and body in Sydney’s club culture. Saarbrücken, Germany: Lap Lambert Academic.
Lévinas, E. (1996). Totalité et infinie. Essai sur l’extériorité. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academics.
Montavont, A. (1999). De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl. Paris: PUF.
Mulley, A., Trimble, C., & Elwyn, G. (2012a). Stop the silent misdiagnosis: Patients’ preferences matter. BMJ, 345, e6572.
Mulley, A., Trimble, C., & Elwyn, G. (2012b). Patients’ preferences matter: Stop the silent misdiagnosis. UK: King’s Fund.
Ortega, F. (2009). The cerebral subject and the challenge of neurodiversity. Biosocieties, 4(04), 425–445.
Padwa, H., & Cunningham, J. (2010). Addiction: A reference encyclopaedia. Santa Barbara, CA, USA: ABC-CLIO.
Peperzak, A. (2009). Sincerely yours. Towards a phenomenology of me. In B. Hofmeyr (Ed.), Radical passivity. Rethinking ethical agency in Levinas. Dordrecht: Springer.
Rock, P. (1973). Deviant behaviour. London: Hutchinson and Co.
Room, R. (1991). Addiction research: Believing in the future. Addiction Research Foundation, 1–7. Retrieved on March 28, 2013 from http://www.robinroom.net/addicres.pdf.
Room, R. (2003). The cultural framing of addiction. Janus Head, 6(2), 221–234.
Schutz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Trans.). Evanston, USA: Northwestern University Press.
Schutz, A. (1970). In R. Zaner (Ed.), Reflections on the problem of relevance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Spinelli, E. (2007). Practising existential psychotherapy: The Relational World. London: SAGE.
Steinbock, A. (1995). Home and beyond. Generative phenomenology after Husserl. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Strasser, S. (1969). The idea of a dialogal phenomenology. USA: Duquesne University Press.
Tart, C. (Ed.). (1969). Altered states of consciousness: A book of readings. USA: Wiley.
The 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (2012). Summary of national findings 1–2. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Serv. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv.
Verdejo-García, A., Pérez-García, M., & Bechara, A. (2006). Emotion, decision-making and substance dependence: A somatic-marker model of addiction. Current Neuropharmacology, 4(1), 17–31.
Wulff, E. (2009). Madness, sense, and meaning. How does the subject get outside of society and history? Theory Psychology, 19(2), 235–243.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Copoeru, I. Understanding Addiction: A Threefold Phenomenological Approach. Hum Stud 37, 335–349 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-013-9307-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-013-9307-8