Human Studies

, Volume 31, Issue 4, pp 399–421 | Cite as

Diabetes, Chronic Illness and the Bodily Roots of Ecstatic Temporality

Research Paper

Abstract

This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children.

Keywords

Adherence Body Chronic illness Compliance Diabetes Ecstatic temporality Merleau-Ponty Heidegger Being and Time Phenomenology Improvisation 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyConcordia UniversityMontrealCanada

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