Abstract
Literature on the mobility of pastoralists and resource access is widely available, but conceptualization and understanding of the socioeconomic processes expected to affect the outcome are inconsistent. In this article, drawing on research conducted in the Yerer and Daketa Valleys, eastern Ethiopia, we use the notion of entitlements to examine how, under increasing pressure for resource access, various agro-pastoral households manage conflicting interests in common grazing resources. We observed that in times of drought and resource scarcity incumbent agro-pastoralists find peaceful sharing arrangements with intruding pastoralists. Asset-poor agro-pastoralists enter into mutually beneficial arrangements with pastoralists, trading their resource endowments to grazing land for other assets from the pastoralists, whereas wealthier households prefer a reciprocal risk-management strategy. These multiple arrangements have distributional effects because asset-poor agro-pastoralist households can stabilize or enhance their household assets and their capabilities in times of drought, and thus benefit from assisting pastoralist migrants to the common grazing land.
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Notes
We understand “institutions” as emerging sites of social interaction, negotiation, and contestation comprising heterogeneous actors with diverse goals. They consist of all rules, customs, and practices in use in the study area. These institutions are based on local beliefs, cultures, and traditions, and are influential in the way local people acquire their access to common grazing land.
The dependency ratio is the ratio of the economically dependent part of the population to the productive part. The economically dependent part is recognized to be individuals under the age of 15 and over the age of 65. The productive part makes up the gap in between (ages 15–64).
Reciprocal arrangement is largely a risk-management strategy by agro-pastoralist community members, in which they accommodate pastoralists and extend their resources, particularly the rangelands and water points, mainly because they expect the same treatment from pastoralists in case members of the agro-pastoral communities face drought and are forced to migrate to areas under the control of pastoralists in the future.
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Acknowledgements
This research received funding through a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, Research Cooperation with Developing Countries)—Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) grant on “The Role of Local-level Institutions in Enhancing Sustainable Rural Livelihoods in Ethiopia”.
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Bogale, A., Korf, B. Resource Entitlement and Mobility of Pastoralists in the Yerer and Daketa Valleys, Eastern Ethiopia. Hum Ecol 37, 453–462 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-009-9236-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-009-9236-3