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Psychological Factors Determining Individual Compliance with Rules for Common Pool Resource Management: The Case of a Cuban Community Sharing a Solar Energy System

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Abstract

This study focuses on individuals’ subjective reasons for complying with rules for common pool resource management. We examine the topic of individual rule compliance, which the commons literature has addressed only marginally, and outline recent empirical findings. Hypotheses are derived based on rule compliance theory and explored using data gathered in a Cuban community sharing a solar energy system. The statistical analyses reveal that compliance with rules for energy management is influenced by various factors. Depending on the particular rule, factors such as sanctioning, legitimacy, and compatibility, among others, influence the frequency of individual rule compliant behavior to differing extents.

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Acknowledgments

Our research in Cuba was supported by José Raúl Díaz López (Departamento Física Aplicada, Universidad de Oriente) and Rubén Ramos Heredia from CIES (Centro de Investigación de Energía Solar) in Santiago de Cuba. We are particularly grateful for their suggestions and comments as well as their logistical support. Finally, we express our gratitude to all the people of Santa Maria del Loreto and El Triunfo who made it possible to conduct our project.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Social Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Zürich, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032, Zurich, Switzerland

    Annette Jenny

  2. Departamento de Electrificación Rural, Centro de Investigaciones de Energía Solar (CIES), Santiago de Cuba, Cuba

    Fernando Hechavarria Fuentes

  3. Department of Systems Analysis, Integrated Assessment and Modelling (SIAM), Swiss Federal Institute for Environmental Science and Technology (EAWAG), CH-8600, Dübendorf, Switzerland

    Hans-Joachim Mosler

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  1. Annette Jenny
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  2. Fernando Hechavarria Fuentes
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  3. Hans-Joachim Mosler
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Correspondence to Annette Jenny.

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Jenny, A., Hechavarria Fuentes, F. & Mosler, HJ. Psychological Factors Determining Individual Compliance with Rules for Common Pool Resource Management: The Case of a Cuban Community Sharing a Solar Energy System. Hum Ecol 35, 239–250 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-006-9053-x

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