Abstract
Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl’s early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book’s general argument, and which I call Husserl’s Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book’s opening chapter, and which I call Husserl’s German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science’s positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl’s early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced.
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Notes
I cite the text of the Prolegomena’s first edition (1900) in this paper. All translations are mine.
For an excellent discussion of Husserl’s robust notion of ‘completeness’ (syntactic completeness plus categoricity) for theories, see Hartimo (2018).
When I say here and elsewhere that science ‘knows’ or is ‘self-knowing,’ I am using an expedient verbal locution. I do not mean that science is a person. I just mean that science, as knowledge someone may have, has the status of knowledge-of-something or self-knowledge-of-something. The something is what is known, or self-known.
I take this distinction of investigation that transforms rather than informs from Nir (2021).
For an indication of how Frege’s logic contains a conflict similar to the conflict I have drawn out in the early Husserl’s logic, see Rödl (2012, 3–7).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to James Kinkaid, Alexandria Yen, Kevin T. Dam, Chad Kidd, Dan Dahlstrom, Walter Hopp, Marc Gasser-Wingate, George Heffernan, Jesse Lopes, Noah Joachim, Jeremy Joachim and an anonymous reviewer for their insightful discussion and comments on early drafts of this article.
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Joachim, Z.J. The Ambivalence of Husserl’s Early Logic: Between Austrian Semanticism and German Idealism. Husserl Stud 40, 45–65 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09338-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09338-4