This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
Subscribe to journal
Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. Subscription will auto renew annually.
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
This distinction is clearly articulated by Steven Crowell, who also argues that associations are not intentional (2013, pp. 135–140). Crowell does not present this as a faithful reading of Husserl, however, but rather as a critique of his genetic project.
Husserl expresses it very clearly in the first lines of section 39 of Cartesian Mediations: “The universal principle of passive genesis, for the constitution of all objectivities given completely prior to the products of activity, bears the title association. Association, it should be, clearly noted, is a matter of intentionality descriptively demonstrable as that, in respect of its primal forms, and standing, in respect of its intentional performances, under eidetic laws. Owing to these, each and every passive constitution is to be made understandable -- both the constitution of subjective processes, as objects in immanent time, and the constitution of all real natural objects belonging to the Objective spatio-temporal world.” (Hua I. Husserl (1973), p. 82/80; my emphasis).
The point here is simply that associative relations (of contrast, similarity, and so on) do not fall from the sky; they are rather based on our experience of the transcendent world, whence the connection Husserl sees to hold between full-fledged intentional experience and what goes on in immanent consciousness.
In my essay on “The Role of Concepts in Perception in Husserl and McDowell” (2011), I was too quick to infer the pre-conceptual nature of experience from the intentional continuity that holds between the constitutive layers of experience.
The following footnote seems to suggest just that: “What I thus call ‘non-intentional’ is not fundamentally different from what other scholars have called ‘preintentional’.” (p. 90)
Thanks to Corijn van Mazijk, Hanne Jacobs, and Daniele de Santis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review.
Breyer, T. (forthcoming). Reflection, attention, and the practice of phenomenology. In: O. Davis, A. Fuentes, and D. Schilling (Eds.), Faber socius: Integrating humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crowell, S. (2013). Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dahlstrom, D. (2007). The intentionality of passive experience: Husserl and contemporary debate. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy,7, 1–18.
Doyon, M. (2011). The role of concepts in perception in Husserl and McDowell. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy,11, 42–74.
Hanna, R. (2008). Kantian non-conceptualism. Philosophical Studies,137(1), 41–64.
Heck, R. J. (2000). Non-conceptual content and the “Space of Reasons”. Philosophical Review,109(4), 483–523.
Hua I. Husserl, E. (1973). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortäge, E. Strasser (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua III/1. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I:Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, 2nd edn., Nijhoff, Den Haag; Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book. General introduction to a pure phenomenology. D. O. Dahlstrom (Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014.
Hua VII. Husserl, E. (1956). Erste Philosophie I (1923–24): Kritische Ideengeschichte. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
Hua XI. Husserl, E. (1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926. M. Fleischer (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic. A. Steinbock (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer, 2001.
Hua XXXI. Husserl, E. (2000). Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung “Transzendentale Logik” 1920/21: Ergänzungsband zu “Analysen zur passiven Synthesis”, R. Breeur (Ed.). Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Hua XXXVIII. Husserl, E. (2005). Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912). Th. Vongehr and R. Giuliani (Eds.). New York: Springer.
Husserl, E. (1972). Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik. L. Landgrebe (Ed.). Hamburg: Meiner Verlag; Experience and judgment. J. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Kant, I. (1992). On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world . In: The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical philosophy 1755–1770, D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
About this article
Cite this article
Doyon, M. Van Mazijk, Corijn: Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell. Husserl Stud (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-020-09267-6