Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou, Walter Hopp (Eds): Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches (Routledge Research in Phenomenology Vol. 2)
There is a growing tendency in contemporary research on the human mind to examine conscious experiences in light of their first-personal character or phenomenology. How things appear to us is not an epiphenomenal property, or a feature of experience explainable in reductionist or behavioral terms; rather, it is a fundamental, and so “ineliminable” (1), aspect of experience. The three co-editors of the volume Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches have gathered fifteen scholarly papers that explore the richness of conscious experience from the first-personal perspective and together attest that “phenomenology plays an indispensable role in our attempt to understand the mind” (2). Admittedly, I was already convinced by this thesis even before opening the book, but reading this great collection made even clearer “the value, relevance, and, indeed, the indispensability of phenomenology for the study of the mind” (2).
The book comprises essays by an...
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