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Notes
See, e.g., the arguments for the existence of cognitive phenomenology in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Crowell touches on the normative aspects of cognitive phenomenology in his contribution to this volume. This is an abiding theme in Crowell’s historical research. See Crowell (2013).
See, e.g., the influential discussion of the centrality of practical self-knowledge to our concept of reflective self-knowledge in Moran (2001).
If the reader knows about this aspect of the analytic debate already, then she can see it in pp. 6-12 of the editorial introduction, where the editors compare and contrast the general contours of the concept of intentionality as it was developed in the phenomenological and analytic traditions.
This is found in the editors’ introduction in the section on introspection (pp. 12–16).
Such a procedure is often regarded as completely appropriate, given the influence of these two philosophers in the phenomenological tradition. As the editors of this volume note, one main thread of discussion in the phenomenological tradition is its own history, and this history is “[i]n Ricœur’s well-known phrase, […] ‘the history of Husserlian heresies’” (p. 1).
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Kidd, C. Thiemo Breyer and Christopher Gutland (Eds.): Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences . Husserl Stud 33, 91–98 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-016-9201-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-016-9201-0