Husserl Studies

, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 1–15

The Metaphysical Neutrality of Husserlian Phenomenology

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-014-9163-z

Cite this article as:
Yoshimi, J. Husserl Stud (2015) 31: 1. doi:10.1007/s10743-014-9163-z

Abstract

I argue that Husserlian phenomenology is metaphysically neutral, in the sense of being compatible with multiple metaphysical frameworks (including frameworks Husserl argued against). For example, though Husserl dismisses the concept of an unknowable thing in itself as “material nonsense”, I argue that the concept is coherent and that the existence of such things is compatible with Husserl’s phenomenology. I defend this metaphysical neutrality approach against a number of objections and consider some of its implications for Husserl interpretation.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cognitive and Information SciencesUniversity of California, MercedMercedUSA

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