Husserl Studies

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 13–25 | Cite as

Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Article

Abstract

The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and CommunicationUniversity of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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