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Using the Shapley Value to Mitigate the Emergency Rescue Risk for Hazardous Materials

Abstract

Due to the catastrophic consequence of possible incidents caused by the storage and transportation of hazardous materials, effectively mitigating such risks is of vital importance. This paper proposes a gradual-coverage game describing the situation of locating emergency facilities, to which the Shapley value can be used to evaluate the candidate locations. To be specific, the rescue risk and utility are assessed in terms of the response time to construct a gradual-coverage game. Then, we characterize the Shapley value by proposing two new axioms. Furthermore, to ensure that the analytical model can be practically applied to real-world situations, an algorithm for locating emergency facilities is designed based on the properties of the Shapley value, which is then tested for efficiency.

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Acknowledgements

This research was partially supported by a Discovery Grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Grant # RGPIN-2015-04013), grants from the National Natural Science Foundations of China (Grant Nos. 61803091 and 71901076), and grants from the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant Nos. 18ZDA043, NO.19VDL001).

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Correspondence to Xun-Feng Hu.

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This research was partially supported by a Discovery Grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Grant # RGPIN-2015-04013), grants from the National Natural Science Foundations of China (Grant Nos. 61803091 and 71901076), and grants from the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant Nos. 18ZDA043, No.19VDL001)

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Ke, G.Y., Hu, XF. & Xue, XL. Using the Shapley Value to Mitigate the Emergency Rescue Risk for Hazardous Materials. Group Decis Negot (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-021-09760-z

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Keywords

  • Risk mitigation
  • Game theory
  • Shapley value
  • Emergency response
  • Hazardous materials