Abstract
Since 9/11, terrorism has become a global issue of the twenty-first century. Terrorist organizations become important actors of world politics as they gain influence on political process and decision-making. Some organizations compete with each other in order to gain more power and influence. We study the distribution of power among terrorist groups using network approach and applying classic and new centrality indices (Short-Range (SRIC) and Long-Range interactions indices (LRIC)). These indices allow to identify terrorist groups with direct and indirect influence on the terrorist network.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The LRIC library is available in Python and can be downloaded from https://github.com/SergSHV/slric.
References
Aleskerov F (2006) Power indices taking into account agents’ preferences. Mathematics and democracy. Studies in choice and welfare. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–18
Aleskerov FT, Andrievskaya IK, Permjakova EE (2014) Key borrowers detected by the intensities of their short-range interactions: working papers by NRU Higher School of Economics. No. WP BRP 33/FE/2014
Aleskerov F, Meshcheryakova N, Shvydun S (2016) Centrality measures in networks based on nodes attributes, long-range interactions and group influence. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05892
Aleskerov FT, Meshcheryakova NG, Shvydun SV (2017) Power in network structures. In: Kalyagin VA, Nikolaev AI, Pardalos PM, Prokopyev O (eds) Models, algorithms, and technologies for network analysis. Springer proceedings in mathematics & statistics, vol 197. Springer, Berlin, pp 79–85
Asal V, Rethemeyer RK (2008) The Nature of the Beast: organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. The Journal of Politics 70(2):437–449
Asal V, Rethemeyer RK (2015) Big allied and dangerous dataset version 2. www.start.umd.edu/baad/database. Accessed 15 July 2019
Asal V, Park HH, Rethemeyer K, Ackerman G (2015) With friends like these… Why terrorist organizations ally. Int Public Manag J 19(1):1–39
Bacon T (2018) Why terrorist groups form international alliances. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
Bond KD (2010) Power, identity, credibility, & cooperation: examining the development of cooperative arrangements among violent non-state actors. PhD dissertation, Penn State University, State College, PA
Findley Michael G, Young Joseph K (2012) Terrorism and civil war: a spatial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem. Perspect Politics 10(2):285–305
Hoffman B (2006) Defining terrorism. In: Hoffman B (ed) Inside terrorism, vol 456. Columbia University Press, New York, pp 1–42
Horowitz MC, Potter PBK (2014) Allying to kill: terrorist intergroup cooperation and the consequences for lethality. J Confl Resolut 58(2):199–225
Karmon E (2005) Coalitions between terrorist organizations: revolutionaries, nationalists, and Islamists. Martinus Nijhoff, Boston
Latora V, Marchiori M (2004) How the science of complex networks can help developing strategies against terrorism. Chaos Solitons Fractals 20:69–75
Mainas ED (2012) The analysis of criminal and terrorist organisations as social network structures: a quasi-experimental study. Int J Police Sci Manag 14(3):264–282
Medina RM (2014) Social network analysis: a case study of the islamist terrorist network. Secur J 27:97–121
Moghadam A (2019) Nexus of global Jihad. Understanding cooperation among terrorist actors. Columbia University Press, New York
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2019) Global Terrorism Database. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Accessed 4 Oct 2019
Nemeth S (2014) The effect of competition on terrorist group operations. J Confl Resolut 58(2):336–362
Newman MEJ (2010) Networks: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Ouellet M, Bouchard M, Hart M (2017) Criminal collaboration and risk: the drivers of Al Qaeda’s network structure before and after 9/11. Soc Netw 51:171–177
Pedahzur A, Perliger A (2006) The changing nature of suicide attacks: a social network perspective. Soc Forces 84(4):1987–2008
Perliger A (2014) Terrorist networks’ productivity and durability: a comparative multi-level analysis. Perspect Terror 8(4):36–52
Phillips BJ (2014) Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity. Int Stud Q 58(2):336–347. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12073
Phillips BJ (2019) Terrorist group rivalries and alliances: testing competing explanations. Stud Confl Terror 42(August):997–1019. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1431365
Smith AG (2008) The implicit motives of terrorist groups: how the needs for affiliation and power translate into death and destruction. Political Psychol 29(1):55–75
Acknowledgements
The paper was prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Program and funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project ‘5-100’. The analysis of terrorist groups network (Sect. 7) was funded by the Russian Science Foundation under Grant No. 17-18-01651. Fuad Aleskerov, Sergey Shvydun and Vyacheslav Yakuba also thanks the International Center of Decision Choice and Analysis (DeCAn Center) of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. We thank the anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Aleskerov, F., Gavrilenkova, I., Shvydun, S. et al. Power Distribution in the Networks of Terrorist Groups: 2001–2018. Group Decis Negot 29, 399–424 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09674-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09674-2