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Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 129–151 | Cite as

Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

  • Eyal Baharad
  • Leif DanzigerEmail author
Article
  • 126 Downloads

Abstract

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

Keywords

Committee decisions Scoring rules “Almost” voting rules 

JEL Classification

D71 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBar-Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBen-Gurion UniversityBeer-ShevaIsrael
  3. 3.Department of Economics and Business EconomicsAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark
  4. 4.CESifoMunichGermany
  5. 5.IZABonnGermany

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