# Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

Article

First Online:

- 126 Downloads

## Abstract

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

## Keywords

Committee decisions Scoring rules “Almost” voting rules## JEL Classification

D71## References

- Ahn DS, Oliveros S (2016) Approval voting and scoring rules with common values. J Econ Theory 166:304–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Baharad E, Nitzan S (2002) Ameliorating majority decisiveness through expression of preference intensity. Am Polit Sci Rev 96:745–754CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Baharad E, Nitzan S (2005) The inverse plurality rule—an axiomatization. Soc Choice Welf 25:173–178CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Baharad E, Nitzan S (2016) Is majority consistency possible? Soc Choice Welf 46:287–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1978) Approval voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 72:831–847CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Chebotarev PU, Shamis E (1998) Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation. Ann Oper Res 80:299–332CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Ching S (1996) A simple characterization of plurality rule. J Econ Theory 71:298–302CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- García-Lapresta JL, Marley AA, Martínez-Panero M (2010) Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context. Soc Choice Welf 34:487–496CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Giles A, Postl P (2014) Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules. Math Soc Sci 68:31–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Lerer E, Nitzan S (1985) Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules. J Econ Theory 37:191–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Llamazares B, Peña T (2015) Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations. Theor Decis 78:429–450CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Mueller D (2003) Public choice III. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Myerson RB (2002) Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games. J Econ Theory 103:219–251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Nitzan S (1985) The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation. Pub Choice 47:349–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Nitzan S, Rubinstein A (1981) A further characterization of Borda ranking method. Pub Choice 36:153–158CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Nurmi H (2002) Voting procedures under uncertainty. Springer, BerlinCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Núñez M, Laslier JF (2014) Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections. Soc Choice Welf 42:313–340CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Richelson JT (1978) A characterization result for the plurality rule. J Econ Theory 19:548–550CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG (1990) The Borda dictionary. Soc Choice Welf 7:279–317CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG (1995) The basic geometry of voting. Springer, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG (1999) Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes. J Econ Theory 87:313–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG (2001) Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting. American Mathematical Society, ProvidenceGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG, Tataru MM (1999) The likelihood of dubious election outcomes. Econ Theory 13:345–363CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Saari DG, Valognes F (1999) The geometry of Black’s single peakedness and related conditions. J Math Econ 32:429–456CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Sen A (1970) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden Day Inc., CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Young HP (1974) An axiomatization of Borda’s rule. J Econ Theory 9:43–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Young HP (1975) Social choice scoring functions. SIAM J Appl Math 28:824–838CrossRefGoogle Scholar

## Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018