Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 561–577 | Cite as

Menu Dependence and Group Decision Making

  • Susumu CatoEmail author


This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.


Collective system rule Group decision making  Arrow’s impossibility theorem Preference system Nestedness   Menu-dependent preference 



I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions. This paper was financially supported by MEXT and the Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Social SciencesTokyo Metropolitan UniversityHachioji-shiJapan

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