Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 379–388 | Cite as

New Voting Correspondences Obtained from a Distance-Based Framework

  • Estefanía GarcíaEmail author
  • José L. Jimeno
  • Joaquín Pérez


We focus on voting methods that can be described from the information contained in the paired comparison matrix, trying to minimize some type of distance with respect to unanimously good situations. In this context, we obtain a new Voting Correspondence family and, to a certain extent, a new voting method belonging to it, called the Lexicographic MaxMin, and we analyze them with respect to some individual rationality properties like Monotonicity and Participation.


Voting Correspondence ρ-norm distance Monotonicity Participation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Estefanía García
    • 1
    Email author
  • José L. Jimeno
    • 1
  • Joaquín Pérez
    • 1
  1. 1.Departamento de Fundamentos de Economía e Historia EconómicaUniversidad de AlcaláAlcalá de HenaresSpain

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