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Group Decision and Negotiation

, Volume 19, Issue 6, pp 527–542 | Cite as

Preference Intensities and Majority Decisions Based on Difference of Support Between Alternatives

  • José Luis Garcí a-LaprestaEmail author
  • Bonifacio Llamazares
Article

Abstract

Simple majority is one of the most used decision rules in practice. However, under this decision rule, an alternative can defeat another one with very poor support. For this reason, other decision rules have been considered in the literature, such as qualified and special majorities as well as other majorities based on difference of votes. In this paper we generalize the latter mentioned voting systems by considering individual intensities of preference, and we provide some axiomatic characterizations.

Keywords

Voting systems Simple majority Majorities based on difference of votes Intensities of preference Fuzzy decision rules 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • José Luis Garcí a-Lapresta
    • 1
    Email author
  • Bonifacio Llamazares
    • 1
  1. 1.PRESAD Research Group, Department of Applied EconomicsUniversity of ValladolidValladolidSpain

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