Alai, M. (2018). How deployment realism withstands Doppelt’s criticisms. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science,9(1), 122–135.
Devitt, M. (2011). Are unconceived alternatives a problem for scientific realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science,42(2), 285–293.
Doppelt, G. (2007). Reconstructing scientific realism to rebut the pessimistic meta-induction. Philosophy of Science,74(1), 96–118.
Doppelt, G. (2011). From standard scientific realism and structural realism to best current theory realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science,42(2), 295–316.
Doppelt, G. (2014). Best theory scientific realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science,4(2), 271–291.
Eronen, M. (2017). Robust realism for the life sciences. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1542-5.
Fahrbach, L. (2011a). How the growth of science ends theory change. Synthese,180(2), 139–155.
Fahrbach, L. (2011b). Theory change and degrees of success. Philosophy of Science,78(5), 1283–1292.
Hempel, C. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth. California: University of California Press.
Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science,48(1), 19–49.
Leplin, J. (1997). A novel defense of scientific realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lyons, T. (2003). Explaining the success of a scientific theory. Philosophy of Science,70(5), 891–901.
Lyons, T. (2016). Scientific Realism. In P. Humphreys (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of science (pp. 564–584). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lyons, T. (2017). Epistemic selectivity, historical threats, and the non-epistemic tenets of scientific realism. Synthese,194(9), 3203–3219.
Lyons, T. (2018). Four challenges to epistemic scientific realism. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science,9(1), 146–150.
Magnus, P. D., & Callender, C. (2004). Realist ennui and the base rate fallacy. Philosophy of Science,71(3), 320–338.
Mizrahi, M. (2013). The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far. Synthese,190(15), 3209–3226.
Mizrahi, M. (2015). Historical inductions: new cherries, same old cherry-picking. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science,29(2), 129–148.
Mizrahi, M. (2016). The history of science as a graveyard of theories: A philosophers’ myth. International Studies in Philosophy of Science,30(3), 263–278.
Musgrave, A. (1985). Realism vs. constructive empiricism. In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (Eds.), Images of science: Essays on realism and empiricism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Park, S. (2011). A confutation of the pessimistic induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science,42(1), 75–84.
Park, S. (2014). A pessimistic induction against scientific antirealism. Organon F,21(1), 3–21.
Park, S. (2016). Realism versus surrealism. Foundations of Science,21(4), 603–614.
Park, S. (2017a). On treating past and present scientific theories differently. Kriterion,31(1), 63–75.
Park, S. (2017b). Selective realism vs. individual realism for scientific creativity. Creativity Studies,10(1), 97–107.
Park, S. (2018a). Justifying the special theory of relativity with unconceived methods. Axiomathes,28(1), 53–62.
Park, S. (2018b). The grand pessimistic induction. Review of Contemporary Philosophy, 17, 7–19.
Park, S. (2019a). New objections to the problem of unconceived alternatives. Filosofia Unisinos, 20(2) (to be determined).
Park, S. (2019b). Optimistic realism over selectivism, Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 33(1), 89–106.
Park, S. (XXXX). Critiques of axiological realism and surrealism, Acta Analytica(forthcoming).
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. New York: Routledge.
Putnam, H. (1975). Mathematics, matter and method: Philosophical papers volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Saatsi, J. (2009). “Grasping at realist straws", review symposium. Metascience, 18, 355–362.
Saatsi, J. (2015). Historical inductions, old and new. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5.
Seeman, J. (2018). From ‘multiple simultaneous independent discoveries’ to the theory of ‘multiple simultaneous independent errors’: A conduit in science. Foundations of Chemistry.. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-018-9304-0.
Stanford, P. Kyle. (2015). Catastrophism, uniformitarianism, and a scientific realism debate that makes a difference. Philosophy of Science,82(5), 867–878.
Stanford, P. Kyle. (2018). A fond farewell to ‘approximate truth’? Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science,9(1), 78–91.
Vickers, P. (2017). Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI. Synthese,194(9), 3221–3232.