Journal of Financial Services Research

, Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 219–240 | Cite as

The Effect of Bank Ownership Concentration on Capital Adequacy, Liquidity, and Capital Stability

  • Pichaphop Chalermchatvichien
  • Seksak Jumreornvong
  • Pornsit Jiraporn
  • Manohar Singh
Article

Abstract

We explore the effects of ownership concentration on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our analysis focuses on East Asian countries because these nations have successfully implemented the Basel standards and demonstrate a high degree of regulatory convergence. For the period from 2005 to 2009, we analyzed the relation between ownership concentration and capital adequacy (Basel II) and find that an increase in ownership concentration by one standard deviation results in an improvement in capital adequacy by 7.64 %. Although Basel III does not go into effect until 2013, we retroactively apply the standards for capital stability on our sample. We find that ownership concentration would have been a significant determinant of capital stability. While at lower levels of ownership concentration, an increase in concentrated ownership would have reduced capital stability; at higher ownership levels, greater ownership concentration would have increased capital stability. We also find that concentrated ownership improves banks’ liquidity. Further, the recent financial crisis does not appear to change the fundamental associations among ownership concentration, capital adequacy, and liquidity.

Keywords

Basel III Bank ownership Capital adequacy Capital stability Financial crisis 

JEL classification

G01 G18 G21 G28 G34 G38 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pichaphop Chalermchatvichien
    • 1
  • Seksak Jumreornvong
    • 2
  • Pornsit Jiraporn
    • 3
    • 4
  • Manohar Singh
    • 3
  1. 1.Bank of ThailandBangkokThailand
  2. 2.Thammasat UniversityBangkokThailand
  3. 3.The Pennsylvania State University-Great ValleyMalvernUSA
  4. 4.National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)Thammasat University, Mahidol UniversityBangkokThailand

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