Abstract
Evidence from response time studies and time pressure experiments has led several authors to conclude that “fairness is intuitive”. In light of conflicting findings, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which conditions an increase in “fairness” due to time pressure indeed provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the “fairness is intuitive” hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al. in Nat Commun 6:7455, 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects decisions under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the “fairness is intuitive” hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person binary dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games under time pressure or time delay. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option. Our main finding is that time pressure does not consistently promote fairness in situations where this would be predicted after accounting for choice difficulty. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that “fairness is intuitive”.
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Notes
We will refer to versions of the DDM that have recently been applied to value-based choices and social dilemma situations (Polanía et al. 2014; Krajbich et al. 2014, 2015b). For a more extensive review of the behavioral foundations and the application of DDM in psychology refer to the descriptions in Ratcliff (1988), Ratcliff and Rouder (1998) and a recent summary of this topic aimed at economists by Clithero (2016).
A more detailed description of the DDM as well as proofs and derivations of all predictions are contained in Online Appendix A.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this crucial distinction and helping us to refine our model.
Online Appendix A contains a more formal discussion of the possible results.
Note that observing no effect is not necessarily evidence against the DDM in these situations. This is because the true model might be that “selfishness is intuitive”. Hence, a negative effect of time pressure attributable to the “selfishness is intuitive” model might be cancelled out by a positive effect attributable to the DDM. For this reason, we cannot jointly reject the FII hypothesis and the DDM.
Labeling the equal outcome as fair in the binary dictator game also aligns our FII predictions with recent findings in Capraro et al. (2017) who show that equal outcomes are preferred by intuitive decision makers whereas deliberation allows for a variety of motives to affect decisions.
We randomized the order in which the prisoner’s dilemma games were displayed across sessions. The filler games were presented in the same order in all sessions. Subjects were not informed that they would make the same choices in both blocks.
To our knowledge there is no common method according to which time pressure was defined in previous studies. For instance, subjects in Rand et al. (2012) were constrained to decide within 10 s which corresponds to the median response time in their response time correlation study. Buckert et al. (2017) define time pressure as 2/3 of the median response time in a Cournot game. Our analysis of response times in the Unconstrained treatment revealed that the response time distribution of the 25% fastest decision makers was independent of the order in which the games were presented. Thus, the time limit in our study avoids heterogeneous effects across different order conditions.
One important limitation of previous studies has been that a large fraction of subjects violate the time constraints set by the experimenter which potentially reduces their explanatory power (Tinghög et al. 2013; Bouwmeester et al. 2017). In contrast, we observed few violations of the time limit: Averaged over all decisions and treatments, the time pressure conditions were violated in 2.5% of the BD and 1.7% of the PD games. There is no significant difference in violations between the TP and STP condition.
In the Time Pressure treatment, subjects were constrained to indicate their belief within 12 s. In the Time Delay treatment, subjects could indicate their belief only after 12 s had passed.
In the Unconstrained condition the games were separated by additional distribution tasks, which were replaced by different filler games in the subsequent Time Pressure and Time Delay conditions. A full analysis of all 12 BD games is available upon request.
We later added the VERY LOW game in the subsequent Time Pressure and Time Delay sessions because each of these games represent a type 1 situation.
Since we do not observe response time correlations or choice frequencies for this game, all time pressure results can only be interpreted under the assumption that it indeed represents a type 2 situation in which there is a majority of fair decision makers. The second assumption is unlikely to hold, given that in the LOW game already only 34% of subjects cooperate despite stronger incentives to cooperate.
Note, that the mean decision time in the TD condition is significantly higher than 6 s and only a minority of decisions (13.8%) is made within the range of 6–7 s. This indicates that there are only few subjects in the TD condition, who have already completed their decision process when reaching the delay cutoff.
More detailed statistics on response time distributions for each game are available in Online Appendix C.
We do not find evidence that there are differences in switching behavior for the VERY LOW game, while there is significantly more switching for the HIGH game in the TP but not in the STP condition. Since both of these game can only provide ambiguous evidence in favor or against the FII hypothesis, we are not discussing these results in more detail.
This method rests on the assumption that subjects have transitive preferences over own-other allocations that are only violated by mistake (Andreoni and Miller 2002).
The five choice patterns are (F, F, F, F), (S, F, F, F), (S, S, F, F), (S, S, S, F) and (S, S, S, S). For any other pattern [e.g. (S, F, S, F)] there is no clear indication in which decision a subject might have made an error that violates transitivity and hence where the indifference point for this subject might be located. Note that a consistent pattern does not necessarily imply that subjects have not made any error since a (S, F, F, F) subject could have made an error in either the VERY LOW game implying that her actual preferences are (F, F, F, F) or in the LOW game implying that her actual preferences are (S, S, F, F) or could have made more than one error.
Due to the smaller group size for some classifications in the STP condition, we pooled data from both time pressure conditions for this analysis.
All response time statistics are available in Online Appendix C.
The full analysis of the remaining games and switching patterns can be found in Online Appendix C.
This is in line with Fiedler et al. (2013) and Capraro and Cococcioni (2016), but differs from Rand et al. (2012). We, however, believe that giving subjects a possibility to fully deliberate on a task before entering the decision screen will affect the chances of isolating intuitive tendencies via time pressure.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Christoph Vanberg, Gustav Tinghög, Ariel Rubinstein, Ernst Fehr, Tobias Pfrommer, Daniel Heyen, Gert Pönitzsch, as well as seminar participants at the University of Heidelberg, ZEW Mannheim, IfW Kiel, Thurgau Experimental Economics Meeting, IMEBESS Rome, Kings College London and ESA Bergen for their helpful comments. In addition, we would like to thank the editors as well as two anonymous referees for their tremendously helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
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Merkel, A.L., Lohse, J. Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure. Exp Econ 22, 24–50 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9566-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9566-3
Keywords
- Distributional preferences
- Cooperation
- Time pressure
- Response times
- Cognitive processes
- Drift Diffusion Models