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Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale

  • Marco Pagnozzi
  • Krista J. SaralEmail author
Original Paper
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Abstract

We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market, with one positive-value bidder, and either one or two speculators who may choose simultaneously whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive profits on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction.

Keywords

Speculators Entry Multi-object auctions Resale Economic experiments 

JEL Classification

D44 C90 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the editor and the referees for extremely helpful suggestions, as well as seminar participants at the 2014 ESA Ft. Lauderdale meeting, the LabSi Lab2 Workshop, the EARIE 2016 Conference, and the universities of Innsbruck and St. Gallen. We would also like to thank Philip Brookins for research assistance, members of the xs/fs group for use of the laboratory at Florida State University, and the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics (IFREE) for funding this Project.

Supplementary material

10683_2018_9564_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (63 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 62 KB)

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and CSEFUniversità di Napoli Federico IINaplesItaly
  2. 2.George Herbert Walker School of Business and TechnologyWebster University GenevaBellevueSwitzerland
  3. 3.GATE Lyon St EtienneÉcullyFrance

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