Experimental Economics

, Volume 21, Issue 3, pp 549–572 | Cite as

A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time

  • Ailin Leng
  • Lana Friesen
  • Kenan Kalayci
  • Priscilla Man
Original Paper


We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-)continuous time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The cooperation levels of the continuous time treatments are not significantly different from the discrete time treatments. Providing subjects with the information on the effort choices of all group members increases the average effort level in continuous time only. The minimum effort level in continuous time with full information feedback is also substantially higher than that with limited information feedback, but the difference is statistically insignificant. With limited information feedback, subjects rarely coordinate to increase their efforts simultaneously to change the group minimum within a period. Our findings imply that continuous time games are not behaviorally equivalent to infinitely repeated discrete time games.


Continuous time Minimum effort game Coordination game Information Laboratory experiment 

JEL Classification

C72 C92 D70 



We received useful comments from audiences at the 2015 Economic Science Association World Meeting in Sydney, the 2015 Australian Conference of Economists in Brisbane, and the 10th Annual Australia New Zealand Workshop on Experimental Economics in Hobart. Specific comments from Paul Frijters, Elias Lafi Khalil, Ryan Oprea, Andreas Ortmann, Anmol Ratan, Vera te Velde and Tom Wilkening are much appreciated. We also thank an anonymous referee for valuable feedback. Funding from the School of Economics at the University of Queensland is gratefully acknowledged. Kenan Kalayci acknowledges financial support from Australian Research Council Grant DE160101242. Many thanks to Maria Bigoni for sharing the z-tree code used in Bigoni et al. (2015).

Supplementary material

10683_2017_9550_MOESM1_ESM.docx (175 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (docx 175 KB)
10683_2017_9550_MOESM2_ESM.pdf (142 kb)
Supplementary material 2 (pdf 142 KB)


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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of EconomicsUniversity of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia

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