The emergence of language differences in artificial codes

Original Paper

Abstract

The paper studies how common codes of artificial language in communication are developed in the laboratory. We find that codes emerging from an environment with more variable spatial positions tend to use a limited set of symbols to represent positions, whereas codes emerging from an environment with more variable geometric shapes tend to discriminate among shapes. The paper also experimentally shows that “language” affects the way its “speakers” share the view about a novel figure.

Keywords

Communication games Coordination Economics of language 

JEL Classification

C72 C92 Z1 

Supplementary material

10683_2017_9518_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (513 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 513 KB)

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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of EconomicsNanyang Technological UniversitySingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsThe Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyClear Water BayHong Kong

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