Experimental Economics

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 78–99 | Cite as

Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment

  • Mikhail Drugov
  • John Hamman
  • Danila SerraEmail author


Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible bribers and bribees. We designed bribery lab experiment that simulates petty corruption transactions between private citizens and public officials. The experimental data confirm that intermediaries lower the moral costs of citizens and officials and, thus, increase corruption. Our results have implications with respect to possible anti-corruption policies targeting the legitimacy of the use of intermediaries for the provision of government services.


Intermediaries Bribery Experiment Moral cost 

JEL Classification

C91 D73 Z19 

Supplementary material

10683_2013_9358_MOESM1_ESM.docx (720 kb)
(DOCX 720 kB)


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Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversidad Carlos III de MadridGetafeSpain
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsSouthern Methodist UniversityDallasUSA

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