Experimental Economics

, Volume 15, Issue 2, pp 309–322

Discrete clock auctions: an experimental study

  • Peter Cramton
  • Emel Filiz-Ozbay
  • Erkut Y. Ozbay
  • Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9301-9

Cite this article as:
Cramton, P., Filiz-Ozbay, E., Ozbay, E.Y. et al. Exp Econ (2012) 15: 309. doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9301-9

Abstract

We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that clears the market. In theory, both the HRB and LAB auctions maximize revenues and are fully efficient in our setting. Our experimental results indicate that the LAB auction achieves higher revenues. This revenue result may explain the frequent use of LAB pricing. On the other hand, HRB is successful in eliciting true values of the bidders both theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords

Clock auctions Pricing rules Market design Experiments 

JEL Classification

D44 C78 L96 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Supplementary material

10683_2011_9301_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (205 kb)
Bidder instructions(PDF 205 kB)

Copyright information

© Economic Science Association 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Cramton
    • 1
  • Emel Filiz-Ozbay
    • 1
  • Erkut Y. Ozbay
    • 1
  • Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

Personalised recommendations