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Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach

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Abstract

We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.

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Correspondence to Charles Bellemare.

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Part of this paper first appeared in Bellemare et al. (2007). An OX code with files implementing all the procedures discussed in this paper can be downloaded at http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/charles.bellemare/. We thank Jim Cox and the Economic Science Laboratory in Tucson, Arizona, for financial and technical support, Urs Fischbacher for his support in programming the experiment, Wafa Hakim for her research assistance in conducting the experiment, and two reviewers for comments.

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Bellemare, C., Bissonnette, L. & Kröger, S. Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach. Exp Econ 13, 334–345 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6

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