We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.
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Goerg, S.J., Selten, R. Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games. Exp Econ 12, 253–271 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8
- Cyclic game duopoly experiment
- Impulse-balance equilibrium
- Payoff-sampling equilibrium