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Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games
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  • Open Access
  • Published: 24 June 2009

Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games

  • Sebastian J. Goerg1,2 &
  • Reinhard Selten2 

Experimental Economics volume 12, pages 253–271 (2009)Cite this article

  • 565 Accesses

  • 7 Citations

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Abstract

We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113, Bonn, Germany

    Sebastian J. Goerg

  2. BonnEconLab, Laboratory for Experimental Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-42, 53113, Bonn, Germany

    Sebastian J. Goerg & Reinhard Selten

Authors
  1. Sebastian J. Goerg
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  2. Reinhard Selten
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sebastian J. Goerg.

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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

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Cite this article

Goerg, S.J., Selten, R. Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games. Exp Econ 12, 253–271 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8

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  • Received: 10 July 2007

  • Accepted: 11 June 2009

  • Published: 24 June 2009

  • Issue Date: September 2009

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8

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Keywords

  • Cyclic game duopoly experiment
  • Impulse-balance equilibrium
  • Payoff-sampling equilibrium

JEL Classification

  • C73
  • D43
  • C90
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