Abstract
We run an experiment to test for peer effects between teams. The subjects perform a team-work task in pairs of payoff-independent teams. They receive feedback about the outcome of their own and the paired team. Consistent with peer effects, we find that this feedback induces substantial correlation of effort choices between teams. The correlation translates into the variation of outcomes within and across pairs of teams.
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Sausgruber, R. A note on peer effects between teams. Exp Econ 12, 193–201 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9209-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9209-1