Skip to main content

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Experimental Economics volume 12, pages 26–41 (2009)Cite this article

Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Access options

Buy single article

Instant access to the full article PDF.

USD 39.95

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

References

  • Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1605–1623.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bohnet, I., & Frey, B. S. (1999). Social distance and other-regarding behavior in dictator games: Comment. American Economic Review, 89, 335–339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: are groups more ‘rational’ players? Experimental Economics, 1, 101–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., & Ziegelmeyer, A. (2004). Individual and group decisions in the centipede game: are groups more ‘rational’ players? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 599–605.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bosman, R., & van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment. Economic Journal, 112, 147–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T., & Mui, V.-L. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarization in the team dictator game. Economic Journal, 107, 1465–1483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95, 477–509.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences: groups vs. individuals and males vs. females. In R. Zwick & A. Rapoport (Eds.), Advances in experimental business research (pp. 331–350). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2006). When are women more generous than men? Economic Inquiry, 44, 587–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, J. C., & Hayne, S. C. (2006). Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents? Experimental Economics, 9, 209–222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D. D., & Harless, D. W. (1996). Group vs. individual performance in a price-searching experiment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 215–227.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, J. (1992). Some compelling intuitions about group consensus decisions, theoretical and empirical research and interpersonal aggregation phenomena: Selected examples 1950–1990. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 3–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Gender composition in teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61, 50–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eliaz, K., Ray, D., & Razin, R. (2006). Choice shifts in groups: A decision-theoretic basis. American Economic Review, 96, 1321–1332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 347–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gillet, J., Schram, A., & Sonnemans, J. (2007). The tragedy of the commons revisited: the importance of group decision-making (Working Paper). University of Amsterdam.

  • Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Güth, W., Schmidt, C., & Sutter, M. (2007). Bargaining outside the lab: A newspaper experiment of a three-person ultimatum game. Economic Journal, 117, 449–469.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahnemann, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review, 76, 728–741.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerr, N., MacCoun, R., & Kramer, G. (1996). Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups. Psychological Review, 103, 687–719.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005). The decision maker matters: individual versus group behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. Economic Journal, 115, 200–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2007). Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments. Empirica, 34, 63–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, T., Bornstein, G., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2007, forthcoming). Trust between individuals and groups: groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy. Journal of Economic Psychology.

  • Levine, J., & Moreland, R. L. (1998). Small groups. In G. Fisher & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. 2, 4th edn., pp. 415–469). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maciejovsky, B., & Budescu, D. V. (2007). Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 854–870.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M. (1969). The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 125–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rockenbach, B., Sadrieh, A., & Mathauschek, B. (2007). Teams take the better risks. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63, 412–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stoner, J. (1961). A comparison of individual and group decisions involving risk. Unpublished master thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston.

  • Sutter, M. (2005). Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size. Economics Letters, 88, 41–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutter, M. (2007). Are teams prone to myopic loss aversion? An experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior. Economics Letters, 97, 128–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutter, M., Kocher, M. G., & Strauß, S. (2006). Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions (Working Paper). University of Innsbruck.

  • Teger, A., & Pruitt, D. (1967). Components of group risk taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 189–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wildschut, T., Lodewijkx, H. F. M., & Insko, C. A. (2001). Toward a reconciliation of diverging perspectives on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: the role of procedural interdependence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 273–285.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Social Science Methodology, University of Oldenburg, Ammerlaender Heerstrasse 114-118, 26129, Oldenburg, Germany

    Wolfgang J. Luhan

  2. Department of Economics, CREED, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Martin G. Kocher

  3. Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15/4, 6020, Innsbruck, Austria

    Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter

  4. Department of Economics, University of Göteborg, P.O. Box 640, 40530, Göteborg, Sweden

    Matthias Sutter

Authors
  1. Wolfgang J. Luhan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Martin G. Kocher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Matthias Sutter
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Martin G. Kocher.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Luhan, W.J., Kocher, M.G. & Sutter, M. Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered. Exp Econ 12, 26–41 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9188-7

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • Dictator game
  • Team behavior
  • Social preferences

JEL

  • C72
  • C91
  • C92
  • D70