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The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment

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Abstract

Recently, there has been a Renaissance for multi-level selection models to explain the persistence of unselfish behavior in social dilemmas, in which assortative/correlated matching plays an important role. In the current study of a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma experiment, we introduce two correlated matching procedures that match subjects with similar action histories together. We discover significant treatment effects, compared to the control procedure of random matching. Particularly with the weighted history matching procedure we find bifurcations regarding group outcomes. Some groups converge to the all-defection equilibrium even more pronouncedly than the control groups do, while other groups generate much higher rate of cooperation, which is also associated with higher relative reward for a typical cooperative action. All in all, the data show that cooperation does have a much better chance to persist in a correlated/assortative-matching environment, as predicted in the literature.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Research Center for Humanity and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Rd. Sec. 2, Taipei, 115, Taiwan, ROC

    Chun-Lei Yang

  2. Department of Statistics, National Chengchi University, 64 Chi-Nan Rd. Sec. 2, Taipei, 11623, Taiwan, ROC

    Ching-Syang Jack Yue

  3. Department of Statistics, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan, ROC

    I-Tang Yu

Authors
  1. Chun-Lei Yang
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  2. Ching-Syang Jack Yue
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  3. I-Tang Yu
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Correspondence to Chun-Lei Yang.

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JEL Classification B52, C91, D74

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10683_2006_9139_MOESEM1_ESM.doc

Appendix for C.-L. Yang, J. Yue, and I.-T Yu (Experimental Economics), “The Rise of Cooperation in Correlated Matching Prisoners Dilemma: An Experiment”

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Yang, CL., Jack Yue, CS. & Yu, IT. The rise of cooperation in correlated matching prisoners dilemma: An experiment. Exp Econ 10, 3–20 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9139-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9139-8

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