Abstract
On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0 ), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Suetens, S., Potters, J. Bertrand colludes more than Cournot. Exp Econ 10, 71–77 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9132-2