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Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners

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Abstract

We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner.

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Correspondence to Catherine C. Eckel.

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JEL Classification C9

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Eckel, C.C., Wilson, R.K. Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners. Exp Econ 9, 53–66 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-4307-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-4307-4

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