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Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019

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Notes

  1. Adapted from Cowie (2019) (p.31).

  2. This term is used to avoid the confusion that Cowie (2019) is focusing on mere categoricity.

  3. This is inspired by Olson (2014).

  4. Cowie (2019) defends veritism whilst claiming he isn’t reliant on it.

  5. See Olson (2014).

  6. Cuneo and Case (2020). Lillehammer (2007) ch.1 for comparison between entanglement-based and analogy-based arguments.

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  1. University College London, 22 Gordon Square, Bloomsbury, London, WC1H 0AW, UK

    Alex Murphy

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  1. Alex Murphy
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Correspondence to Alex Murphy.

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Christopher Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy

New York, United States of America, Oxford University Press, 2019. Hardback, ISBN: 9780198842736, $60/€51, 256 pp.

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Murphy, A. Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 24, 629–632 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10172-w

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10172-w

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