When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi

The original article was published

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

  1. 1.

    We mean that R has an unfair (i.e., unjustified) DBD (Fritz and Miller 2018: 123).

  2. 2.

    Though he does not blame, he may be disposed to blame. If he does have an unfair DBD then he lacks the standing to blame, on our account.

  3. 3.

    Rossi explicitly acknowledges that we understand standing as a right (560, fn. 18). If he is engaged with us in a genuine debate, he must understand standing as a right.

  4. 4.

    Roadevin also acknowledges this (2018: 145).

  5. 5.

    Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to clarify this.

  6. 6.

    Todd 2019 claims that the fact that hypocrisy undermines moral standing has no explanation.

  7. 7.

    See Fritz and Miller forthcoming.

References

  1. Alicke M, Gordon E, Rose D (2013) Hypocrisy: what counts? Philos Psychol 26:673–701

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Bell M (2013) The standing to blame: a critique. In: Coates DJ, Tognazzini NA (eds) Blame: its nature and norms. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 263–281

    Google Scholar 

  3. Fritz KG, Miller DJ (2018) Hypocrisy and the standing to blame. Pac Philos Q 99:118-139

  4. Fritz KG, Miller DJ (forthcoming) The unique badness of hypocritical blame. Forthcoming in Ergo.

  5. Isserow J, Klein C (2017) Hypocrisy and moral authority. J Ethics Soc Philos 12:191–222

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Roadevin C (2018) Hypocritical blame, fairness, and standing. Metaphilosophy 49:137–152

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Rossi B (2018) The commitment account of hypocrisy. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 21:553–567

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Szabados B, Soifer E (1999) Hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will: how to do moral philosophy with examples. Metaphilosophy 30:60–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Todd P (2019) A unified account of the moral standing to blame. Nous 53:347–374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Wallace RJ (2010) Hypocrisy, moral address, and the equal standing of persons. Philos Public Aff 38:307–341

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Steve McFarlane, Justin Capes, and Maggie O’Brien.

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kyle G. Fritz.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Fritz, K.G., Miller, D.J. When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 379–384 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-09997-3

Download citation