Abstract
It is often alleged that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves a negative interpersonal response for that transgression, blaming responses such as resentment and indignation being paradigms. Aside from a few exceptions, guilt is cited in recent discussions of moral responsibility, if at all, as merely an effect of being blamed, or as a reliable indicator of moral responsibility, but not itself an explanation of moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case s/he deserves to feel moral guilt for that transgression. I argue that this alternative view offers all that the predominant blame-focused view offers, while also solving some puzzling features of moral responsibility. Specifically, it offers a compelling way to reconcile conflicting intuitions about the suberogatory, and allows those who do not understand what Darwall calls ‘second-personal’ reasons to be morally responsible for their immoral acts.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See Feinberg (1970, 55–94); Gibbard (1990, 42); Wallace (1994, 76–77); Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 5–8); Strawson, G. (2002, 452); Bennett (2002); Clarke (2005, 21); Fischer (2006, 63); Darwall (2006) and (2013); Shoemaker (2007) and (2011); Waller (2011, 2–5); McKenna (2012, 150); Boxer (2013); Scanlon (2013, 101–102); Pereboom (2014, 2).
For example, Nomy Arpaly (2006, 9–39), Angela Smith (2007), and Tim Scanlon (2008, 122–214) argue that (i) through (iii) are necessary and sufficient. George Sher (2006) argues for a view of blame that only requires (i) and (iv). Michael McKenna argues that all of these conditions are required (2012, 21–29).
For Watson, the only relevant moral deficiencies will be those attributable to the agent’s authentic character, as revealed through the agent’s actions. I think that’s correct. But nothing in this essay hangs on that. So I have worded (i) to allow a broader range of moral deficiencies, including mere thoughtlessness.
Also see Rosen (2015, 67).
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
David Shoemaker (2015, 221) appeals to the ‘fittingness’ of negative responses to explain liability, but speculates that what he calls a ‘fitting’ response may just be another name for a ‘deserved’ response.
The non-instrumental goodness of a response may not always offer a justification to respond. However, as Derk Pereboom points out, the non-instrumental goodness of a state of affairs typically offers those who are appropriately situated a defeasible justification to bring about that state of affairs (2014, 139). Also see Norcross (2006, 46–47).
I consider an emotion towards an agent ‘moral’ whenever it is by virtue of a belief about the moral status of that agent or her actions; e.g. a belief that the agent is virtuous, vicious, good, bad, has acted wrongly or well, etc. This is the kind of belief implicated by moral disapproval (Wallace 1994, 33–38).
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
This is one way to interpret Darwall (2006, 71, 112 and 168).
However, I take it a person can genuinely care about moral norms without feeling guilty for unfreely transgressing those norms. See Pereboom (2017, 130–132).
This is another way to interpret Darwall (2006, 168).
Derk Pereboom remarks that “It might well be appropriate...to feel the pain of grief upon the death of a loved one, while this pain is not deserved” (2017, 131). Carlsson (2017, 111) uses this example to distinguish, correctly I think, between the ‘fittingness’ of a response, and a deserved response. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of this distinction in this example, as well as the analogy to fitting responses to art.
This is one way to read Strawson (1982).
An anonymous reviewer points out that, given what we know from findings in psychology, Robinson is much easier to conceive of as a non-human agent.
The view originates with Strawson (1982).
Gary Watson (1996, 239) offers a different argument to the same conclusion.
References
Arpaly N (2006) Merit, meaning, and human bondage; an essay on free will. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Bennett C (2002) The varieties of retributive experience. Philos Q 52:145–163
Bennett C (2008) The apology ritual: a philosophical theory of punishment. Cambridge University Press, New York
Boxer K (2013) Rethinking responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Carlsson A (2017) Blameworthiness as deserved guilt. J Ethics 21(1):89–115
Clarke R (2005) On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Midwest Stud Philos 29:13–24
Clarke R (2013) Some theses about desert. Philos Explor 16(2):153–164
Clarke R (2016) Moral responsibility, guilt, and retributivism. J Ethics 20:121–137
Copp D (1997) Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: blameworthiness and moral responsibility. Noûs 31(4):441–456
Darwall S (2006) The second-person standpoint. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Darwall S (2013) Morality, authority, and law: essays in second-personal ethics I. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Driver J (1992) The Suberogatory. Australas J Philos 70(3):286–295
Feinberg J (1965) The expressive function of punishment. Monist 49(3):397–423
Feinberg J (1970) Doing and deserving: essays in the theory of responsibility. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Feinberg J (1986) The moral limits of the criminal law, volume 1: harm to others. Oxford University Press, New York
Fischer J (2006) My way: essays on moral responsibility. Oxford University Press, New York
Fischer J, Ravizza M (1998) Responsibility and control: a theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Gibbard A (1990) Wise choices, apt feelings; a theory of normative judgment. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Goldberg J, Lerner J, Tetlock P (1999) Rage and reason: the psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. Euro J Soc Psychol 29:781–795
Harman G (2009) Guilt-free morality. In: Shafer-Landau R (ed) Oxford studies in metaethics, vol 4. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 203–14
JJC S (1961) Free-will, praise and blame. Mind 70(279):291–306
Kleinig J (1971) The concept of desert. Am Philos Q 8(1):71–78
MacNamara C (2013) Taking demands out of blame. In: Tognazzini N, Coates J (eds) Blame: its nature and norms. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 141–161
McKenna M (2012) Conversation and responsibility. Oxford University Press, New York
Mill J (1872/2009) Utilitarianism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Moore M (1993) Justifying retributivism. Isr Law Rev 2:15–49
Morris H (1988) The decline of guilt. Ethics 99(1):62–76
Nelkin D (2011) Making sense of Freedom & Responsibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Norcross A (2006) Reasons without demands: rethinking rightness. In: Dreier J (ed) Blackwell contemporary debates in moral theory. Blackwell, Malden, pp 38–54
Pereboom D (2009) Free will, love, and anger. Ideas y Valores: evista de Colombiana de Filosofía 141:169–189
Pereboom D (2014) Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pereboom D (2017) Responsibility, regret, and protest. In: Shoemaker D (ed) Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Volume 4. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 121–140
Rosen G (2015) The alethic conception of moral responsibility. In: Clarke R, McKenna M, Smith A (eds) The nature of moral responsibility: new essays. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 65–88
Ross WD (1930) The right and the good. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Scanlon T (2008) Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame. Belknap Press, Cambridge
Scanlon T (2013) Giving Desert its Due. Philos Explor 16(2):101–116
Schmidtz D (2002) How to deserve. Polit Theo 30:774–799
Sher G (1987) Desert. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Sher G (2006) In praise of blame. Oxford University Press, New York
Shoemaker D (2007) Moral address, moral responsibility, and the boundaries of the moral community. Ethics 118(1):70–108
Shoemaker D (2011) Attributability, answerability, and accountability: toward a wider theory of moral responsibility. Ethics 121:602–632
Shoemaker D (2015) Responsibility from the margins. Oxford University Press, New York
Skorupski J (1999) Ethical explorations. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Smith A (2007) On being responsible and holding responsible. J Ethics 11(4):465–484
Smith A (2012) Attributability, answerability, and accountability: in defense of a unified account. Ethics 122:575–589
Strawson P (1982) Freedom and resentment. In: Watson G (ed) Free will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 59–80
Strawson G (2002) The bounds of freedom. In: Kane R (ed) The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 441–460
Wallace RJ (1994) Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Waller B (1990) Freedom without responsibility. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
Waller B (2011) Against moral responsibility. MIT Press, Cambridge
Watson G (1996) Two faces of responsibility. Philos Top 24(2):227–248
Widerker D (1991) Frankfurt on 'Ought implies Can' and alternative possibilities. Analysis 51(4):222–224
Williams B (1985) Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Zimmerman M (1988) An essay on moral responsibility. Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey
Acknowledgments
The view that I develop in this paper was first presented at the Free Will and Moral Responsibility Conference (Florida State University, 2015). Special thanks to Derk Pereboom, Michael McKenna, Kate Manne, and Michelle Kosch for valuable comments and conversations on drafts of this paper since that time, as well as the participants of my Freedom Center Colloquium presentation (Arizona State University, 2017).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Duggan, A.P. Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 21, 291–309 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9863-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9863-0