Abstract
This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency (i.e. the ability to control and manipulate all aspects of one’s agency). The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller—and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and in neglecting some obvious ways in which the enhancement project can be planned so as to avoid its degradation. The second objection, though common to several writers, has been most directly asserted by Saskia Nagel, and is concerned with the impact of hyperagency on the burden and distribution of responsibility. Though this is an intriguing objection, I argue that not enough has been done to explain why this is morally problematic. I try to correct for this flaw before offering a variety of strategies for dealing with the problems raised.
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Notes
They do not map on for the reason that solidarity exchanges are not examples of pure altruism as they may involve some expectation of future return. Furthermore, the return expected in an economic exchange is not merely one that is hoped for or expected, it is one that can be legally enforced.
I’ve added the last bit since it seems necessary in order to give a charitable interpretation to Hauskeller. In the original, there is nothing at the end of that sentence, which leads to the odd conclusion that without gratitude there is no reason at all to help others. But of course there is such a reason: to get something for oneself. In context, however, I suggest that the sentence does imply the qualifier I have added.
Wood et al., in addition to reviewing the evidence offers, practical guidance for increasing the sense of gratitude.
I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers for raising these objections.
Indeed, I complain about this argumentative style in the enhancement debate in Danaher 2013.
The problem is discussed at much greater length in Douglas 2014. Douglas highlights for different versions of the objection and responds to them at some length.
The issue is much debated in the literature on free will as to whether such genetic manipulation undermines one’s autonomy. I think there is reason to believe that it does not insofar as one’s self develops after the point of genetic manipulation and one still has (compatibilist) control over one’s reasoning processes, but I accept that this is contested.
Others have defended this claim, but have not emphasised the potential badness of this shift in perception, e.g. Santoni de Sio et al. (2014)
Nagel (2010) p. 14 at fn 7 says “there are pressing questions concerning distributive justice…that need to be considered carefully. This cannot be done in the present article.”
I discuss the effects on personal well-being at length in Danaher (2014).
The two examples I discuss concern the imposition of liability where the failure to enhance results in harm to another. I focus on these cases because they are ones in which both the moral stakes are high (due to the presence of potential victims) and the potential ‘costs’ to the person who fails to enhance are high. Nevertheless, in focusing on these two examples, I do not mean to completely exclude the possibility that enhancement could affect other judgments of responsibility in an analogous way. Thus, for example, your failure to cognitively enhance might result in an inability to find work, and society might, consequently, deny you access to social benefits (e.g. job-seekers allowance). The analogy might be that a failure to enhance yourself is similar to a failure to actively seek out employment, and hence the impact on one’s access to the social benefit should be similar. The argument I make below about the unfair distribution of compliance burdens could potentially apply to such cases, though perhaps less strongly since the moral stakes seem slightly lower. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.
Indeed, Rumbold and Wasik suggest that current criminal law doctrine may be even more punitive than the tracing criterion.
And if there is a causal link between my breach of duty of care and the injury or harm to the victim. I ignore issues of causation in this discussion.
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582
Goold and Maslen argue that currently available cognitive enhancers would not alter professional duties, but they do not rule out the possibility of future enhancement technologies doing so.
I don’t mean to stigmatise or single out epileptic drivers here as this is true for other groups too e.g. young male drivers tend to present greater risks than other drivers. If enhancement technologies can lower the risks they present, they could be targeted in much the same way.
The discussion of these different tastes can be found in section IV of Sepielli’s article.
This example is Sepielli’s.
Ignoring some complicating factors arising from Type II diabetes. Assume I talk exclusively of Type I here.
Whether they do offset the burden is a question that cannot be determined purely in the abstract.
The effect of automation on human activities is beyond the scope of this article, but it could well subvert the need for imposing the compliance burden in the first place. But removing humans from the loop may come with other unwelcome costs.
Admittedly, the use of legal means for sharing the effort burden might be more corrosive of solidarity than non-legal means. It would be better if there could be some general shift in cultural attitudes that encourages us to take that view. This may be feasible through some public education and consciousness-raising. That said, the possibility of the law effecting a change in cultural attitudes and beliefs should not be completely discounted.
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Nicole Vincent, Filippo Santoni de Sio, Philip Robichaud, Nadira Faber and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
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Danaher, J. Human Enhancement, Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 359–378 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9624-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9624-2